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On June 16, 1981, at a time when pressure for the privatization of
West Germany's wholly public broadcasting system was reaching a fe-
verish intensity,1 the German Constitutional Court2 handed down its
third television3 decision.4 It reaffirmed and complemented the court's
earlier two decisions, which had resolutely claimed television for the
public interest. In all three the court defined the broadcasting media as
servant to the democratic process and demanded that it be responsive
to society as a whole.5 Coming once every ten years, these decisions
form a seemingly impregnable unity of policy, yet the future of West
German broadcasting remains in fact uncertain.6
The reasons for this uncertainty are many. Foremost is the devel-
opment of new telecommunications technologies, especially cable tele-
vision. Claims are made that cable television will effectively remove
the "frequency shortage ' 7 upon which much of German broadcast ju-
risprudence is based. With a large number of channels available, it is
argued that television should be on essentially equal constitutional
footing with the press, where a plurality of opinion is guaranteed by the
marketplace.8
As such, there would be no need for an institution which is at the
1. For a description of the pressures affecting German television, see infra text accom-
panying notes 7-21. For an overview of the German television system, see A. WILLIAMS,
BROADCASTING AND DEMocRAcY IN WEST GERMANY (1976).
2. For a discussion of the function of this court see, eg., Benda, Constitutional Jurisdic-
tion in West Germany, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1981).
3. Television and broadcasting are used interchangeably in this Note, following the
practice of the Constitutional Court, and both terms include radio. But cf. W. HoFFM.tANN-
RiEM, KOmMERziELLEs FERNSEHEN 25 (1981) (claiming that the differences between radio
and television might support a constitutional distinction between the two media).
4. Judgment of June 16, 1981, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG], 57 Bundesvcrfas-
sungsgerichtsentscheidungen [BVERFGE] 295 (1982). The first two decisions were Judgment
of Feb. 22, 1961, 12 BVERFGE 205 (1962); Judgment of July 27, 1971, 31 BVEJLFGE 314
(1972).
5. See generally A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1.
6. See, ag., Kabelfernsehen - Voile Fahrt nach yam, 43 SPIEGEL, Oct. 25, 1982, at 38-42
[hereinafter cited as Kabelfernsehen].
7. See, eg., Pestalozza, Der Schutz vor der RundfunXfreiheit in der Bundesrepubli-
Deutschland, 1981 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 2158, 2160. United States
broadcast law likewise builds on the frequency shortage argument. See Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
8. Pestalozza, supra note 7. This argument is also being made in the United States.
See, eg., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413
passim (1983). It is interesting to note that arguments about the imminent disappearance of
the spectrum or technical scarcity were being pressed before the United States Supreme
Court as early as 1968-69. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396.
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heart of current German broadcasting: "internal pluralism."9 Under
this system, the state grants monopoly charters to public broadcasting
corporations and then mandates that these corporations' boards of di-
rectors, or "broadcasting councils,"10 consist primarily of representa-
tives of various "socially relevant groups."" The mechanism of
internal pluralism 2 is designed to reflect the diversity of society by re-
creating it inside the station. 13
Another challenge to the public monopoly of West German televi-
sion came (at the time of the third decision) in the form of a satellite
which the government of Luxembourg had planned to begin operating
in early 1985, broadcasting a German-language commercial program
to a large segment of West German viewers.14 Fears were voiced that
West German public television would be so vitiated by the commercial
competition as to make it no longer viable in its present form.'" Al-
though Luxembourg has since abandoned this particular plan,16 the
specter of commercial broadcasting from space, as well as from other
countries, remains a long-range threat to German public television.
17
Perhaps the greatest danger, however, comes from inside West
Germany itself. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has wit-
nessed a political shift to the right, which has placed the opponents of
public television in power."8 The Social Democratic government of
Helmut Schmidt was a stalwart defender of public television. Schmidt
9. See infra text accompanying notes 103-107.
10. See, e.g., the law chartering Radio Bremen: Gesetz aiber die Errichtung und die
Aufgaben einer Anstalt des offentlichen Rechts-Radio Bremen, June 18, 1979, (hereinafter
cited as Bremen Law), reprinted in W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, RUNDFUNKFREIHEIT DURCIl
RUNDFUNKORGANISATION 162-70 (1979). The author wishes to express his indebtedness to
Professor Dr. Hoffman-Riem for his thoughtful treatments of both German and American
media law, as well as his generous assistance in the preparation of this Note, See also W.
HOFFMAN-RIEM, supra note 3.
11. See, e.g., 57 BVERFGE at 322, 330. For a list of social groups typically seen as
"relevant," see infra note 129.
12. The Constitutional Court uses the phrase "binnenpluralistische Struktur" (see, e.g.,
57 BVERFGE at 332). The exact translation is "internally pluralistic structure," The noun
form, Binnenpluralismus, translates as "internal pluralism" or "interior pluralism."
13. See Bremen Law, supra. note 10, §§ 1-2. English translations of these chartering
laws (for example, that of the Hessian Radio, Hessischer Rundunk) are often available from
the stations on request.
14. See Lower, Ausltandisches Werbefernsehen und deutsches Verfassungsrecht, 1981
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 730-34.
15. Id
16. See The Cabling of Europe, 288 THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 1983, at 35, 36-37.
17. Id See also infra notes 342-48 and accompanying text.
18. See Kabelfernsehen, supra note 6.
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himself described the danger of private television to the German com-
monweal as "more acute and dangerous than that of nuclear power."' 9
The new Christian Democratic Union (CDU) government of Helmut
Kohl speaks, in sharp contrast, of giving the media industry a "free
hand for the application of modem techniques." 20 According to the
CDU's party platform, "the existing monopoly of public law broadcast-
ing hinders new forms of information transmission.",'
The battle is being fought partly in the German Constitutional
Court and partly in the wider social and political arena.22 It remains to
be seen which forum will be determinative and which view will ulti-
mately prevail.
This Note will describe the legal status and structure of German
broadcasting as it is today, and then closely examine the effect which
the latest German Constitutional Court decision will have on that sys-
tem. It will address the questions of whether and under what circum-
stances private broadcasting is now possible, and what the introduction
of cable television means for the future of the German system. The
Note will look at the concept and reality of internal pluralism and criti-
cize its faults.
Finally, this Note will consider what relevance the German model
has for the United States' broadcasting landscape. This consideration
will entail a critique of existing United States media law, leading to
suggestions that German media jurisprudence be the basis for a consti-
tutional amendment, and that the internally pluralistic governance
model be introduced into the public broadcasting structure in the
United States.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF GERMAN
BROADCASTING
A. Historical Background
Perhaps the most ironic aspect of West German broadcasting his-
tory is that United States occupation forces are largely responsible for
19. Id at 39.
20. Id
21. Medienkonzept, Yom Bundesausschuss der CDU am IZ3.1975, reprinted in Braun &
Darkow, Kommunikationspolitische Konzepte, in Femsehcn und Horfunk far die Demokra-
tie 203, 216 (J. Aufermann, S. Scharf, & 0. Schlie eds. 1979).
22. See generally Gesprach mit Christian Schwarz-Schilling, 43 SPIEGEL, Oct. 25, 1982, at
55-60.
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the public nature of postwar German broadcasting. 3 After the fall of
the Third Reich, during which period television had been firmly in the
hands of the state propaganda machinery, the Americans, along with
the French and English allies, decided that such a future one-sided mo-
nopolization of German media was to be avoided.24
Two allied strategies operated in pursuit of this goal. The first was
the convening of a constitutional convention. 25 There the allies tried to
instill in the framers of the German constitution a respect for democ-
racy and individual rights, and to guide them in the direction of a de-
centralized federalism. 6 As part of the effort to decentralize both
administrative and economic power in Germany, the "cultural sover-
eignty" (Kulturhoheit -which included the power to make laws regulat-
ing broadcasting), was given to the individual German states (Ldnder)
and not to the federal government (Bund).27
The second part of the plan was to create broadcasting stations in
the form of public non-profit corporations, either "through decree of
the Military Governments (French and British sectors) or through laws
of the Ldnder, on which laws the Allies exerted considerable influ-
ence."28 The primary objective was to keep the state out of broadcast-
ing. 2  But the de facto public law form of the stations seemed to
indicate that the stations were also not to be delivered into the hands of
private economic interests.30
The political insulation intended by the public law form was sup-
plemented by the method of financing chosen for the stations. Instead
of being supported from the state treasury, the stations were funded
primarily by user fees.31
23. References to this history are found both in the first part of the first television deci-
sion, 12 BVERFGE at 208-12, and in A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 7-18.
24. A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 8-9; 12 BVERFGE at 210.
25. A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 8-9.
26. Id
27. Id at 8-10.
28. 12 BVERFGE at 210.
29. Id It is important for the American reader to understand the distinction the
Germans make here between state (staatlich, meaning government) institutions, like the post
office, and societal (Offentlich, meaning public) institutions, like universities. See, e.g., lqfra
text accompanying notes 47 and 50.
30. A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 8-11.
31. The public television system in Germany finances itself largely (approximately 75%)
through user fees amounting to less than six dollars a month per user. See 1979 ARD
JAHRBUCH 62-63, 194-95. See also infra note 35 and accompanying text. The remaining one
quarter of the broadcasting revenue comes from advertising which is confined to a one hour
period in the evening, usually between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m.
The American reader may wonder why the German viewer would watch an hour of
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Apart from these general precepts, the theoretical framework of
German broadcasting remained somewhat vague under the Allied tute-
lage.32 It was not until the first television decision in 1961 that the
Germans themselves passed on the constitutionality of that inherited
framework and began to concretize it in a distinctively German
manner.
33
B. The First Two "Television" Decisions
1. The factual settings
In 1961 the German Constitutional Court ruled on the constitu-
tionality of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's plan for a state-run televi-
sion station.34 By this time, the various L.inder-based stations had long
since joined together into a single federation, the ARD .35 Adenauer,
feeling that the ARD was too liberal,36 formed Deztschland-Fernsehen
GmbH for the purposes of "representing the nation to itself" 37 and
"cultivating the continuity of tradition." 38
With the totalitarian misuse of German media for Nazi propa-
ganda purposes still fresh in the national memory,39 the Constitutional
Court rejected the new company, declaring that the German media
may in no case be delivered into the hands of the state.40 Owning 100%
of the stock in Deutschland-Fernsehen, the federal government ran
commercials, but the author observed during a two year residence in West Germany that the
insertion of two to three short films during the hour seems to keep people in front of the
television.
A potentially more significant fact is that the German government contributes practi-
cally nothing to the stations. Id Several judges on the Constitutional Court have stated that
such government funding would be unconstitutional because it would create a dependency
relationship. 31 BVERFGE at 344 (Geiger, Rinck and Wand, dissenting). The court goes on
to say that a similar dependency on advertising revenues might also be unconstitutional.
"[Tlhe one-sided commercializing of television and radio could well conflict with the protec-
tion and assertion of the public interest and commonwealth which is demanded by the pub-
lic nature of the broadcasting medium." 31 BVERFGE at 345. See alro infra note 263 and
accompanying text.
32. A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 10.
33. Id
34. 12 BVERFGE at 205.
35. A. SMITH, THE SRADOW IN THE CAVE 62 (1973). The.ARD, orArbeitsgemeinrchoqf
fr i.ffendichrechtliche Rundfunkanstaften der Bunderrepublik Deutrchland, was formed in
1950. A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 18.
36. A. SMITH, supra note 35.
37. 12 BVERFGE at 252.
38. Id
39. See id at 209-10.
40. A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 27; 12 BVERFGE at 262.
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afoul of this proclamation.4'
Ten years later, in 1971, the Constitutional Court faced the ques-
tion of whether the fees which the public broadcasting stations collect
from users were not in fact business proceeds subject to tax.42 The tax
authorities argued that the fees represented no more than payment for
services rendered,43 and that the stations were in that respect private
businesses subject to tax liability. The court, however, ruled that
broadcasting stations were public entities and not businesses, and
hinted that the real purpose of the proposed tax might have been to
reduce the competitive advantage which public broadcasting enjoyed
over private mass communications such as newspapers." The majority
held that the fees did not represent a business exchange because they
were collected regardless of whether the viewer/participant 45 actually
watched the program.46 Broadcasting was viewed as an extension of
public dministration, although not a "state" activity.47
The dissenting opinion viewed television as a public utility,48
claiming that the fees did represent payment for services rendered.49
The dissent nevertheless agreed with the majority that broadcasting
was a public function and task. 0
The result of these two decisions-one defending public broad-
casting against state co-optation, the other opposing its characterization
as a commercial enterprise-was the formula: "neither state nor
private."'"
41. 12 BVERFGE at 263. Neither the constitutional authority of the federal government
to regulate telecommunications activities (GRJNDGESETZ [GG] art. 73, 7 (W. Ger.)) nor its
mandate to legislate on supra-regional affairs (GG art. 83) could justify this exercise of fed-
eral power. 12 BVERFGE at 226-31, 250-53, 264.
42. 31 BVERFGE at 314.
43. Id at 319.
44. Id at 321.
45. It is interesting that the Germans use the word "participant" (Teilnehmer) for the
word viewer, thereby strengthening the idea that broadcast speaker and broadcast listener
are part of the same integrated unit. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 204-05.
46. 31 BVERFGE at 330.
47. Id
48. Id at 343 (Geiger, Rinck, and Wand, dissenting).
49. Id at 344.
50. Id at 344-45; see 57 BVERFGE at 319 for the court's characterization of the second
decision.
51. Thomas, Prvatfunk, Staats/unk oder was? Zur Zukunfi des Rundfunks, in Div
VERTEIDIGUNG DER RUNDFUNKFREIHEIT 91 (W. Thomas ed. 1979). As Mr. Thomas ad-
mits, and as is demonstrated in this Note (see infra text accompanying notes 113-16, 267-99),
the Constitutional Court has not dejure excluded private television, although this has been
the defacto effect of its decisions.
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2. Article 5-its public sense and purpose
Although the structure of radio and television stations is deter-
mined by legislation at the state level, such state charters must be con-
sonant with the principles of the federal constitution.52 Thus all West
German media jurisprudence begins with article 5 of the German Basic
Law (Grundgesetz), which is the German equivalent of the first amend-
ment to the United States Constitution: "Everyone has the right to
freely express and disseminate his opinion by speech, writing and pic-
tures, and freely to inform himself from generally accessible sources.
Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by broadcast and film
are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship." 53
It was on the "freedom of reporting by broadcast" or "broadcast
freedom" clause of article 5 that the German Constitutional Court
anchored its response to the first two challenges to the postwar status
quo of West Germ~n broadcasting.54
Both of the early decisions began by discussing the public nature
of the broadcasting medium. The court opened the substantive part of
the first opinion by stating: "[T]he content of article 5 of the Basic Law
and the therein contained constitutional guarantee of freedom of
broadcasting is of fundamental importance for the whole public, polit-
ical and constitutional life in the German Lander. . . ,,55 The court
was even more emphatic in the second decision, declaring that "the
essence of broadcasting shows itself in its commitment to the general
public,"56 and "it fulfills in reality a public task. .. an integrating
function for the state as a whole."57 Even the dissenting opinion con-
curred in this point: "Article 5 points broadcasting in the direction of
society." 58
But this was hardly more trenchant than statements by United
States legislators in 193419 and by the United States Supreme Court in
196960 that the public interest has priority in the exploitation of the
52. Snow, Telecommunications and Media Policy in IVest German,, 32 J. Cosi. 9, 13 n.2
(1982).
53. GG art. 5, 1. All translations in this note are those of the author unless otherwise
noted.
54. 12 BVERFGE at 260; 31 BVERFGE at 326.
55. 12 BVERFGE at 259.
56. 31 BVERFGE at 328. "General public" is the author's translation forll1gemeinheit.
57. 31 BVERFGE at 329.
58. Id at 337 (Geiger, Rinck and Wand, dissenting).
59. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
60. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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airwaves. It is at this point, however, that the German Constitutional
Court made its decisive theoretical step. The importance of broadcast-
ing, asserted the court, lies in its relationship to the democratic state. It
catalyzes the public process of Meinrngsbildung,6' or opinion-building.
This leads to a public "will-building" which finds its final form in a
democratic election.62 Broadcasting is not only a "medium" of opin-
ion-building, but an "eminent factor"6 3 of that process as well. In other
words, broadcasting is not only a carrier of ideas, but also a catalyst
which itself contributes to the growth and refining of opinion. The in-
stitution of broadcasting must therefore be protected:
As a result of developments in television technology, broadcast-
ing has become one of the most powerful means of mass communica-
tion which, because of its wide-reaching effect and possibilities as
well as the danger of misuse for one-sided propagandizing, cannot be
left to the free play of [market] forces.64
In order to protect the process of opinion-building in and through
broadcasting, it had to be free both from the state65 and any overly
powerful private entity.66 More importantly, article 5 commands that
this process be promoted through broadcast institutions which are so
structured that all socially relevant voices "get their say" 67 and are
"able to exert influence" on the programming of the stations. 68 This is
the sense and purpose of broadcast freedom.
3. Institutional and individual freedoms, objective and
subjective rights
The German court compared the situation of broadcasting with
the "institutional sovereignty of the press [reaching] from the locating
of information to the publication of reports and opinions. '69 The
healthy functioning of both institutions is seen by commentators as
"constitutionally essential.. .in light of the central function of article
61. 31 BVERFGE at 325.
62. Judgment of July 19, 1966, 20 BVERFGE 56, 98 (1967).
63. 12 BVERFGE at 260.
64. 31 BVERGE at 325. It is clear in context that the German phrase 'Yreie Spiel der
Krafte" refers to the "free play of market forces".
65. 12 BVERFGE at 260.
66. 31 BVERFGE at 325.
67. 12 BVERFGE at 262.
68. 31 BVERFGE at 326.
69. 12 BVEREGE at 260. The court makes clear that when it speaks of "freedom of
reporting by means ... of broadcasts," it is referring to the totality of programming, from
news to music, all of which is capable of "opinion-building." Id
[Vol, 7
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5 for a vitally democratic and pluralistic community. °70 Just as the
press must be protected in its whole process, so must the broadcasting
entity be secure in its insulation from outside influence.7'
The term "institutional freedom" had gained widespread currency
as the description for this constitutional protection 72 In the famous
Spiegel case,73 the German Constitutional Court held that this institu-
tional freedom implied at least some obligation on the part of public
officials to give information to the press,74 as well as the affirmative
duty of the government "to ward off the dangers to a free press which
could grow from the formation of a monopoly of opinion."7 5 In an-
other press case, 6 the Constitutional Court specifically addressed the
economic aspects of such monopolies, declaring that "Freedom of
opinion and freedom of the press protect the process of opinion build-
ing. . . in a free democracy; they. . . do not serve to guarantee eco-
nomic interests. 77
The positive command of institutional broadcast freedom is con-
trasted with the defensive character of that freedom.78 This polarity,
however, often gives way to a shorthand dichotomy between the objec-
tive and subjective elements of this or any other constitutional right 79
The objective element or character of a given constitutional right
refers to a guarantee independent of any given individual." It is un-
derstood as a constitutional norm, a guideline or task for the legisla-
ture, directing the lawmaker to create certain institutions in
70. Stern, Neue Medien-neue Aufgaben des fechts?, 1982 DEUTSCHES VERWAL-
TtUNGSBLATr 1109, 1116.
71. 12 BVERFGE at 261; 31 BVERFGE at 326.
72. Stem, supra note 70, at 1114 and n.7 1.
73. Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, 20 BVERFGE 162 (1967). In this case, the court dealt
with the search and seizure of various documents from the Spiegel office following its publi-
cation of an article claimed to be treasonous about the combat-readiness of the German and
NATO armies.
74. Id at 175-76.
75. Id at 176.
76. Judgment of February 26, 1969, 25 BVERFGE 256 (1970), Blinkfter decision. Here
the court dealt with the attempt of the Springer Press to freeze out all magazines which
carried East German television schedules. This was Springer's "patriotic" response to the
building of the Berlin Wall. The court granted the petition of the communist newspaper
Blinkfiaer, which claimed that such a boycott was illegal because it interfered with the insti-
tutional freedom of the press.
77. Id at 265.
78. See Hoffmann-Riem, The Freedom of Communications and the Future of Broadcast-
ing, 17 STUDIES OF BROADCASTING 61 (1981).
79. Stem, supra note 70, at 1115.
80. P. BADURA, VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE BINDUNGEN DER RUNDFUNK-
GESETZGEBUNG 22 (1980).
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conformance with the constitutional mandate.8 1 Thus, while a given
broadcasting station might (as a legal person) subjectively assert the
right of broadcast freedom, 2 the objective character of that right is
found in the article 5 "guarantee" of a broadcast system capable of
fulfilling its public task.83 This guarantee commands the legislature to
construct a "positive order" in which all socially important information
is represented within the broadcast system.84
Because broadcast freedom is primarily oriented toward the public
good,85 and designed to "serve"8 6 the purposes of a democratic state, its
objective component is usually viewed as determinative within the
broadcasting context.8 7 It remains unclear whether an individual right
to broadcast privately is indeed a constitutionally protected right.88
Even if it is constitutionally anchored, such individual broadcast free-
dom (which, its proponents admit, is really the same as entrepreneurial
freedom8 9) could be asserted only in a situation where the "positive
order" necessary to guarantee broadcast freedom was present. 90
4. Broadcasting's special situation
Many of the above observations and determinations of the nature
of mass media apply to both broadcasting and the press. Beyond their
commonality, however, the German court found, as did its American
counterpart, 91 factors which distinguish the legal status of broadcasting
from that of the press. These are collectively referred to as the "special
situation of broadcasting."9 These factors are, in most analyses, neces-
sary to justify the different treatments which broadcasting receives, 1 e.,
state regulation in the United States and public monopoly in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany.
Two component factors are universally identified: 1) the shortage
of broadcasting frequencies and 2) the large financial burden of start-
81. Id
82. 31 BVERFGE at 321 (holding that several public law stations had standing as "judi-
cial persons of public law" to file constitutional complaints alleging that the planned tax at
issue violated their institutional broadcast freedom).
83. Id
84. Id.
85. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., 31 BVerfGE at 340 (Rinck, Geiger and Wand, dissenting).
87. P. BADURA, supra note 80.
88. See 57 BVERFGE at 318; see also infra note 267 and accompanying text.
89. Stem, supra note 70, at 1114.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 113-16 and 207-08.
91. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388; see also supra note 6.
92. 12 BVERFGE at 261.
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ing a station or producing broadcasting programming.93 As the Ger-
man court stated:
[I]n view of the unique qualities of broadcasting and television,
especially. . . the limited number of frequencies available. . . and
the costliness of studio technology and the huge effort necessary for
the production of programs, the creation of such broadcasting units
cannot be left to the whim of individuals or groups, because this
would surely lead to a situation where one or more well financed
interests or socially powerful groups would take over the public role
of broadcasting.94
Opponents of the present public law structure of television in West
Germany point to the coming of cable television as a phenomenon
which will dissolve the special situation." In focusing on spectrum
scarcity, these critics ignore the forms of scarcity which the court sees
growing out of broadcasting prerequisites other than spectrum space:
the equipment, expertise and capital necessary to produce broadcasting
programming.96 They also do not take account of other unique quali-
ties of broadcasting, micluding its suggestive power and central role in
communal opinion building, which inform much of the court's
analysis.97
The court stated that the special situation would only dissolve
"when all interested groups or combinations of groups . . . could be
granted a frequency."98 Thus the question is raised whether the simple
addition of five, eight, or twelve channels to a given locality's broad-
casting capacity would be enough to remove the constraints of the spe-
cial situation.99
5. Consequences of the special situation
The German Constitutional Court found that much more drastic
consequences resulted from the special situation than did its United
States counterpart. Whereas in the United States the effort was made
to provide for the public interest by imposing content regulations on
93. See, eg., id
94. 31 BVERFGE at 338 (Geiger, Rinck and Wand, dissenting). This echoes the first
decision and anticipates language in the unanimous third decision. See 12 BVERFGE at
261; 57 BVERFGE at 320.
95. See, eg., Pestalozza, supra note 7, at 2159.
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
97. See 31 BVERFGE at 325 (Geiger, Rinck and Wand dissenting). The third decision
was even more emphatic. 57 BVERFGE at 325; see infra text accompanying note 203.
98. Id at 338.
99. See F. HYMMEN, DAS KABEL-FAKTEN UND ILLUSIONEN 93 (1976).
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stations from the outside,'" in Germany the effort was directed at
shaping broadcasting activity from the inside. According to the Ger-
man court:
There is no state competence to influence the . . . shaping of
program content. . but rather-as long as it is necessary-the state
competence lies in regulating the organizational form of the carrier of
that public task. This is to be done always and only under the aegis
of article 5 of the Basic Law, whereby radio and television are to be
kept free from the state and, at the same time, the participation and
expression of all socially relevant groups in a balanced relationship
within the total radio and television industry is to be guaranteed.'
Article 5 then demands-as long as the special situation obtains-
that the individual German Linder enact laws regulating the organiza-
tional form of broadcasting stations in such a way that guarantees their
functioning in their prescribed public role.'1 2
6. Internal pluralism
The organizational form which the Lidnder have mandated is in-
ternal pluralism.0 3 It is the essential genius and central mechanism of
the German model. The article 5 constitutional command of broad-
casting freedom is fulfilled by state-chartered public law corporations
with internally pluralistic boards of directors or broadcasting coun-
cils. 11 Though the court's focus has remained on internal pluralism, it
has not precluded the possibility of other governance structures or
modes of participation and expression for the various social groups and
powers.-
Although the German Constitutional Court did not elucidate all
the details of the internally pluralistic mechanism, the essence of the
concept was evident from the beginning: "[The broadcast council] is to
be composed in a balanced manner of representatives of all world
100. See infra text accompanying notes 367-69.
101. 31 BVERFGE at 338-39. It should be noted that content regulations (fairness, objec-
tivity, and balance) are called for in most station charters, and thus the state does, in an
indirect way, shape program content. The author of this Note has chosen not to deal with
them specifically both because they are subordinate to the concept of internal pluralism and
because their value is seriously questioned. See W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 10, at 40-
41.
102. 12 BVERFGE at 261.
103. See W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 10, at 164.
104. Id..
105. Internal pluralism is not necessarily to be identified with the public-benefit corpora-
tion. See 31 BVERFGE at 337.
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views and of all important political and social groups. They are to
have the power to control those who are actually making programming
decisions."'116 The second decision articulated further:
ITlhe broadcasting council, the highest organ of a station, which rep-
resents the interests of the general public in the area of broadcasting,
has in most stations the tasks of electing or ratifying the election of
the station director (Intendant), ascertaining that editorial guidelines
are observed, and approving the station's budget.'0 7
Thus the stations themselves were conceived as carriers'0 8 which
do not exist for their own ends. 0 9 The dissenting opinion in the second
decision went so far as to suggest that the stations themselves had no
autonomy" 0 and that the internally pluralistic broadcasting council
was merely an "instrument by which the socially relevant groups fulfill
their public function" of democratic opinion-building."' The court
has subsequently rejected this view, declaring that stations are legally
autonomous and the various social groups are held to possess no in-
dependent "group right" to participate on the broadcasting council.13 2
7. Is private television possible under article 5?
From the beginning, the German courtwas at great pains to de-
clare that article 5 does not necessarily demand the corporate form then
existing:
The German Constitution especially does not demand that pro-
ducers of broadcast programs be only organizations of public law. A
corporation of private law might also be a carrier of this sort of pro-
gramming, if in its organizational form there was sufficient guarantee
that, in a way similar to the public law corporation, all relevant soci-
etal groups get to speak." 
3
106. 12 BVERFGE at 262.
107. 31 BVERFGE at 328.
108. The German word for carrier-Trager-is sprinkled throughout the opinions. Al-
though it does not exactly connote the American notion of common carrier with its implied
obligation to serve all comers, the word "Trager" signifies a passive instrumentality dedi-
cated to the common good. See 12 BVERFGE at 262, 263; 31 BVFERFGE at 339, 340.
109. 12 BVERFGE at 262. It is interesting that the diffusion of editorial control has
progressed so far, theoretically at least, that even the individual reporter is said to have a
certain editorial autonomy. See generally W. HOFFMANN-RaEt, REDAKTIONSSTATUTE 3M
RUNDFUNK (1972).
110. See 31 BVERFGE at 340 (Rinck, Geiger and Wand, dissenting).
Ill. Id
112. Judgment of Feb. 9, 1982, 60 BVERFGE 53, 63-66 (1982).
113. 12 BVERFGE at 262.
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Thus the private corporation would also be essentially a carrier. 1t 4 In
order to fulfill its societal task, a private station would have to meet the
following requirements: 1) it would have to be independent from the
state and 2) it would have to provide for the participation of all socially
relevant groups.1 5 What this means in practice was articulated in the
third decision, where the court faced a demand from a private station
which claimed it had met these requirements." 16
8. The question of a public broadcasting monopoly
The issue of whether or not private stations are constitutionally
permissible is alternatively stated as the question of whether public sta-
tions may constitutionally be given a monopoly. Just as the court held
that there are no constitutional reasons barring the participation of pri-
vate broadcasting stations under certain circumstances, the court has
held that there are also no reasons barring a monopoly for public
broadcasting:
It would not contradict article 5 of the Basic Law when, under
the present technological circumstances, a station, equipped with
such a safety device [as internal pluralism], were to be granted a mo-
nopoly. . . in the production of broadcast programming; it is on the
other hand not constitutionally necessary to create such an institution
117
114. 31 BVERFGE at 339 ([P]ublic law. . . and private law stations [would] fulfill the
same public task in the same way as commanded by article 5." For a cogent explanation of
the public law/private law duality in civil law countries, see R. SCHLESINGER, COMI'ARA-
TIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT AND MATERIALS 42-89 (4th ed. 1980). It is in some ways appropri-
ate that the electronic media should come under the aegis of public law, as Professor
Schlesinger notes that public law is largely a product of the twentieth century. Id at 609,
115. 31 BVERFGE at 325-26.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 177-248.
117. 12 BVERFGE at 262.
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III. GERMAN BROADCASTING IN PRACTICE
A. Internal Pluralism and Station Governance
The new state charter given to Radio Bremen by the Bremen par-
liament in 1979118 can serve as a model for the internally pluralistic
broadcasting station." 9 Although incorporating a few innovations, 2 '
it is still fairly typical of organizational form in German broadcasting
stations.
Similar to other West German broadcasting laws, the form and
purpose of the station are set down in the charter law. Radio Bremen is
a non-profit "public benefit institution of public law" with its corporate
seat in Bremen. 2 It is to serve the whole population with information,
education and entertainment. "  "The shaping of the broadcasts must
...be free from government influence and the one-sided influences of
political, economic, religious or other interest groups."1 3
As in most other German stations 124 there are three main organs
of control: the broadcasting council (Rundfunkrat), the administrative
council (Verwaltungsrat), and an executive, here the Direktorium.11
The Direktorium, composed of three to five persons, replaces the single
Intendant"z6 found in most German stations. The Breman law man-
dates that an Intendant be among the directors, but his or her only
individual competency is to make decisions which require quick action.
118. See Bremen Law, supra note 10.
119. It should be noted that there are two strains of internal pluralism currently being
used in West Germany. One is the so-called pure pluralism, where the social groups them-
selves elect their representatives. Representative of this style are the Hessian Broadcast sys-
tem (HR) and Radio Bremen (RB). The other strain is the so-called parliamentary model
where the parliament elects the representatives of the relevant groups after they have been
"nominated" by those groups. Examples of this model are West German Broadcasting
(WDR) and North German Broadcasting (NDR). This latter strain does not produce the
desired political independence of the broadcasting council as effectively as does the former.
See A. WILLAMS, S.upra note I, at 99-111.
120. Among the innovations: I) the replacing of the Intendant with the Direktorim (see
ingfra text accompanying note 125) and 2) mechanisms for more comprehensive pluralism
(see infra text accompanying note 130).
121. Bremen Law, supra note 10, § 1.
122. Id § 2(1).
123. Id § 2(2).
124. Two exceptions to the norm are the Berlin stations: Sender Freles Berlin (SFB) and
Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), which have only Raundfunkrat and Intendant. See A.
WLLIAMS, supra note 1, at 96; ARD JAHRBUCH, supra note 31, at 148-49.
125. Bremen Law, supra note 10, § 4. See also supra text and accompanying note 118.
126. The Intendant/Direktorium's duties are described further in Walenreiter, Bar
Dreiecksverhaltnis von Intendant, undfmk und Venwaltngsrat, in FERNsE.nEN, EIN ME-
DIUM SI-r SICH SELBST 169-73 (W. Brtlssau, D. Stolte & R. Wisser eds. 1976).
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The directors composing the Direktorium are selected to five-year
terms by the broadcasting council. Their duties consist of the daily di-
rection of the station and determining the composition of the daily pro-
gram, drafting (but not approving) the financial plan of the station,
buying and selling property involved in the station operation, and the
exercising of final authority in all personnel decisions. 2 7
The administrative council consists of nine members-six elected
by the broadcasting council and three by the employees of the station.
Although its duties are left largely unspecified by the Bremen law, the
administrative council's competence usually consists of supervising the
administrative aspects of the station.128 It is, however, forbidden from
exercising any authority over program shape or content.1
29
Programming decisions belong on the short term to the
Direktorium and over the long term to the broadcasting council. The
Bremen charter specifically sets out the "relevant social groups" which
are, in turn, to elect representatives to the broadcasting council. 3 '
The specific tasks of the broadcasting council include the election
(and recall) of the members of the Direktorium and administrative
council, advising the Direktorium in all broadcasting questions, moni-
toring adherence to the editorial principles outlined in the Bremen law,
127. Bremen Law, supra note 10, § 13.
128. Wallenreiter, supra note 126.
129. Bremen law, supra note 10, § 10.
130. Id § 5(3). The broadcasting council is to consist of:
1) one representative of the City of Bremen, elected by the Senat of the Free
Hanseatic City of Bremen;
2) one representative of the City of Bremerhaven, elected by the Maglstrat of
the City of Bremerhaven;
3) one representative of the Office of Science and Art of the City of Bremen;
4) one representative of the city parliament of Bremen;
5) one representative of the teachers of Bremen and Bremerhaven, elected by
the personnel office of the local school boards;
6) one representative of the parents of Bremen and Bremerhaven, elected by
the local Parents' Committee;
7) one representative of the Bremen Commission on Continuing Education,
8) one representative of the Bremen University Conference;
9) one representative of the Protestant Church;
10) one representative of the Catholic Church;
11) one representative of the Jewish community;
12) two representatives of the German Federation of labor;
13) one representative of the German Office Workers Group;
14) one representative of the local councils of employers;
15) one representative of the local chambers of commerce;
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and ratifying the station's budget.' By virtue of its power to elect the
members of the other control groups, it is clear that the broadcasting
council, and through it the socially relevant groups which represent so-
ciety itself, retains the balance of power in the broadcasting station . 32
B. Problems of Internal Pluralism
1. Influence of political parties
By far the biggest problem with the internally pluralistic structure
is the changing influence of the political parties. 3 3 The Bremen char-
ter is unusual in that only three of the thirty-five potential members
come from the political parties.'3 4 Several other representatives on the
council will obviously have close connections to the various political
parties. 135 It is nevertheless unlikely that the sum total of expressly
political seats will rise to one-third of the total seats, which is becoming
the generally accepted constitutional limit for the German stations as
posited by theorists of German broadcasting. 3 6
On a nationwide level, the figures are somewhat higher. Of the
16) one representative of the local handworkers' guilds;
17) one representative of the local chambers of city employees,
18) one representative of the local associations of manual laborers;
19) one representative of the Bremen Youth group;
20) one representative of the Bremen Federation of Sport;
21) two representatives of women's organizations in Bremen, elected by the
Bremen Women's Committee;
22) one representative of the Bremen Music Council;
23) one representative of the Bremen Journalists' Colloquium;
24) one representative of the German Journalists Union;
25) one representative of the Theater Guild of Bremen;
26) three representatives of the Bremen Parliament (elected in proportion to
their representation in parliament--if not every party gets a seat, then the number
of representatives will be increased to accommodate that party);
27) five representatives to be elected by the Office of Science and Art of the
City of Bremen. These are to represent groups which are otherwise difficult to
organize and not adequately represented in the above 26 paragraphs.
Paragraph 27 represents an innovative attempt to give representation to the under-
represented or unrepresented in society. The disabled and the Turkish guestworkers are
among the groups thereby envisioned. Id § 6(2)(2). W. HOFFMAN-RjIE., sjpra note 10, at
44-51.
131. Bremen Law, supra note 10, § 7.
132. Compare infra notes 235-48 and accompanying text.
133. See A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 120-23. See also Schlie, Organization undgesell-
schafiliche Kontrolle des Rundfunks, in FERNSFHEN UND HORFUNK FOR DIE DEitOKRATiB
53 (J. Aufermann, S. Scharf & 0. Schlie eds. 1979).
134. Bremen Law, supra note 10, § 5(3)(26).
135. Id §§ 5(3)(1), 5(3)(2), 5(3)(4).
136. A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 118.
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approximately 367 members of German broadcasting councils, 130 or
more belong to the executive or legislative branch of government.13 7
This becomes more pernicious when these members combine with
others supposedly representing the socially relevant groups, but who
are, in fact, also party members. Party influence is likewise extended
into other areas of the station. Of the ninety members of German ad-
ministrative councils, forty-nine, or fifty-four percent, are either civil
servants or members of the executive or legislative branches. 138
At first blush, this level of political (and government) influence
would seem to violate the constitutionally mandated "independence
from the state."' 39 Although the Constitutional Court has consistently
held that: "[A]rticle 5 does not prevent representatives of the state from
taking an appropriate number of seats in the organs of the "neutral-
ized" broadcasting carriers,"' 40 it is quick to add that "Article 5 does
on the other hand prohibit the state from directly or indirectly domi-
nating the station which produces broadcasting programs." ''
This is, however, exactly what is happening. The representatives
of the parties combine with other representatives into large party-polit-
ical coalitions.'42 Before meetings of the broadcasting council, a
number of council members retire to party conclaves (Freundeskreise,
or circles of friends) to confer with the party elders. 143 This necessarily
reduces the difference between pluralistic broadcasting stations and
political parliaments to a "procedural formality, ' 'l4W and may be seen
as a de facto constitutional violation. 41 Plurality of opinion is trun-
137. Schlie, supra note 133, at 58.
138. Id at 59.
139. 31 BVERFGE at 322.
140. 12 BVERFGE at 263.
141. Id
142. Schlie, supra note 133, at 56-61. The effect is that there are Social Democratic and
Christian Democratic stations.
143. A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 124-27. This politicization is precisely the danger
which Hans Bredow foresaw in 1946, predicated on his experiences as one of the founders of
the German Broadcasting Company (Reichsfunkgesellschaft): "Experiences of the past have
shown that the participation of political parties will lead to the carrying out of political
conflicts within the broadcasting institution." Schneider, Parteieneinfluss !,?n Aundftik, in
FERNSEHEN LrND H6RFUNK FOR DIE DEMOKRATIE 116 (J. Aufermann, S. Scharf & 0.
Schlie eds. 1979) (quoting H. Bredow).
144. A. WILLIAMS, supra note I, at 125 (quoting Manfred Jenke, Director of West Ger-
man Radio). Only those who see an identity between party and society (that is, certain party
ideologues) do not find this development troubling. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 143, at
122.
145. Schiie, supra note 133, at 59-60.
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cated by party polarity,146 and the actual work of the station in pre-
empted by political struggles. 147
The solution to this problem, according to at least one observer, is
the complete removal of all state, civil service, and party representa-
tives. 148 The "incompatibility" between state office and parliamentary
mandate on the one hand and membership in a broadcasting organ on
the other "can be based on article 5 of the Basic Law and the democ-
racy principle in conjunction with the [1961] television decision of the
Constitutional Court."'
149
2. Lack of completely pluralistic representation
Another problem of internal pluralism (which the Bremen law ad-
dresses) 5' is the difficulty in finding representation for all socially rele-
vant groups. The groups which are represented in the broadcasting
council are generally those with large memberships and high public
profile (the unions or the chamber of commerce, for example) or those
whose purpose is socially sanctioned (parents' and teachers' groups).'
West German legislators have found it troublesome to determine repre-
sentative groups for those segments of society which are difficult to or-
ganize or which stand at the edge of society: the poor, the elderly, the
disabled, and the foreign nationals who are in the country as "guest
workers." 152
Various solutions have been advanced. One is the purely theoreti-
cal attempt to eliminate the problem by claiming that the groups pres-
ently included in the broadcasting council will or should take as their
primary task the representation of the general public, in what amounts
to a variation on the parliamentary theme. Thus the groups presently
seated are in themselves sufficiently pluralistic to insure the considera-
tion of the absent and unorganized groups of society, thereby supplying
the station organization with the needed democratic legitimacy. 5 3
146. Schneider, supra note 143, at 122.
147. See the description of the wrangling over the election of the Intendant at the ZDF
and WDR stations, in A. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 128-29.
148. Schlie, supra note 133, at 59-60.
149. Id at 60.
150. Bremen Law, supra note 10, § 5(3)(27).
151. W. HOFFMANN-RiEM, supra note 10, at 45.
152. Id
153. See generally Bethge, Rechtsschutzprobleme eines rundfunkspe-farchen Pluralirmus,
81 ARCHIV FOR URHEBER-FILM-FUNK-UND THEATERRECHT 75 (1978). See also A. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 1, at 100-01; Schlie, supra note 129, at 55.
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This overlooks the fact that power often perpetuates itself.154 As
the already represented groups are, for the most part, established socie-
tal institutions, they will most likely perpetuate the status quo both in
society and within the station.15 5 Input, feedback, and criticism from
other groups and segments of society, both inside and outside the sta-
tion, will probably be constrained if not suppressed. 15 6 This contradicts
the principle of a pluralistically organized democracy based on the the-
oretical equality of all groups in pursuing their own interests.157
Other attempts to rectify inadequate representation of socially rel-
evant groups include the one made in Bremen to have representatives
of the underrepresented groups identified by a government office and
inserted into the broadcasting council in an extra-democratic fash-
ion.58 Pursuing this line of thought further, some experts demand a
"loosening of the communication system from the power system."'' 9
They maintain that a "given group's chances of access to the broadcast-
ing council should be inversely proportional to its chances otherwise to
participate in the public debate."' 60
According to this theory of "inverse proportionality"' 6 1 or "com-
pensatory relevance,"' 62 groups like the chamber of commerce or the
national unions, which already have a high degree of public visibility
and can attract media attention when they want it, should give way in
the broadcasting councils at least partially to groups such as the poor
and the guest workers, who do not have such media access.' 63
3. Determination of the socially relevant groups
The determination of the socially relevant groups is of fundamen-
tal importance and of special interest to American readers who have
difficulty imagining how the German system can function effectively.
This problem is related to the above discussion, yet curiously is not
154. W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 10, at 45.
155. Id at 45, 49.
156. Id at 50.
157. Id at 59; see also Hoffmann-Riem, Medienfreiheit, in SOZIALWISSENSCIIAFTEN IM
STUDIUM DES RECHTS, 2 VERFASSUNGS- UND VERWALTUNGSRECHT 56, 62 (1977).
158. Bremen Law, supra note 10, § 5(3)(27).
159. W. HOFFMAN-RIEM, supra note 10, at 49 (citing Langenbacher & Mahlc, Ulnkehr-
proporz und kommunikative Relevanz, in 1974 PUBLIZISTIK 322).
160. Langenbacher & Mahle, supra note 159, at 328.
161. Id
162. Hoffmann-Riem, Programmgrundsatz-Programmverantwortung-Progranmmkontrolle,
RUNDFUNK UND FERNSEHEN 125, 136 (1979); Hoffmann-Riem, Chancengleichheil in zuklJl!f-
tigen Kommunikationssystemen, 1976 ZEITUNG FOR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 291, 298.
163. Hoffmann-Riem, 1976 ZRP, supra note 162, at 294.
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emphasized in the German literature. '
One approach to the identification of socially relevant groups lies
in the initiative of the groups themselves. Although German law ap-
pears to hold that a person or corporate entity has no individual or
subjective right to broadcast,16 5 that person or group may challenge the
composition of the broadcasting council.' 66 At least one German court
has held that social groups have a right to demand participation and
consideration in the process of selection of broadcasting council dele-
gates. 67 Another observer has gone so far as to say that social groups,
upon a showing of "relevancy" (probably equivalent here to high social
profile), have an individual right to a seat on the broadcasting coun-
cil. 6 This view has recently been rejected by the Constitutional
Court.
16 9
Another approach is for the government or some third party to
identify the social groups. The lack of generally recognized principles
of selection, 170 however, together with the disinclination of politicians
to unleash any unnecessary societal conflict,' 7 ' makes it difficult to find
representation for those social segments beyond the pale of organized
and firmly established interest groups, compounding the problem dis-
cussed immediately above. 172
German lawmakers do have a certain constitutional latitude in
164. One critic, Professor Hoffmann-Riem, does address the problem squarely: "Gener-
ally recognized principles of election are lacking." W. HOFFmANN-REiu, supra note 10, at
50. For his solution, see infra text accompanying note 175.
165. See, e.g., Starck, Teilhabeansprlche auf RundfunkkAontrolle und lAre gerichtlihe
Durchsetzung, in PRESSERECHT UND PRESSEFREIHEIT, FESTSCHRIFT FOR MARTIN L&FFLER
ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG 375 (1980); but see, eg., Pestalozza, supra note 7. Here one must
distinguish between the constitutionality of private broadcasting (see supra text accompany-
ing notes 113-16), and the right of any given individual to engage in such broadcasting.
166. Starck, supra note 165, at 388.
167. Decision of August 29, 1978, Oberverwaltungsgericht [OVERwG], LIaneburg. par-
tialy reprinted in 1979 JZ 24. See also Starck, supra note 165; Stock, Neues fiber Verbande
undRundfunkkontrolle, 1979 ARCHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 1; B. LUEMMEL, DIE BIN-
NENPLURALITXT DES OFFENTLICH-RECHTLICHEN RUNDFUNKSYSTEMS IN DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 27 (dissertation, Marburg 1982). This decision concerned
the broadcasting council of North German Broadcasting (NDR), where members of the
relevant social groups are elected directly by the parliament (of Schleswig-Holstein in this
case).
168. Starck, supra note 165, at 387; but see B. LUEMMEL, supra note 167, at n.149.
169. Judgment of Feb. 9, 1982, 60 BVERFGE 53, 63-66 (1982); see also text accompany-
ing note 112 supra.
170. W. HOFFMANN-REIM, supra note 10, at 50.
171. Id
172. See supra text accompanying notes 150-63.
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their determination of the relevant groups 7 3  Some German
lawmakers have informally called in social and media scientists, as well
as legal experts, to assist them in this effort. 174 Nevertheless, this is a
weak spot in the German model.
One media specialist suggests what amounts to a five-point plan to
deal with this uncertainty: 7 5 1) an express legislative proclamation
supporting the inclusion of non-established groups in the broadcasting
council; 2) a series of public discussions to create a consensus on which
groups are relevant; 3) the encouragement of experiments, such as the
one in Bremen where a certain number of seats are reserved for unor-
ganized groups; 4) a gradual replacing of the current legislative latitude
with generally recognized criteria for the selection of the socially rele-
vant groups; and 5) the development of a procedure to examine the
further participation of those groups already included.
In order to establish recognized criteria of social relevance, a com-
mission of social and media scientists could be formed to synthesize the
results of the public hearings with the larger body of scientific knowl-
edge. This commission, however, should be far removed from any in-
terests in the media power they themselves will be distributing. If the
committees suggested in points four and five above were to function on
a continuing basis, the flexibility necessary to allow the broadcasting
council to evolve with the changing social landscape would be
provided. 176
IV. THE THIRD DECISION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
A. Background
In its third television decision, 7 7 the German Constitutional
Court held that a state law permitting private television was unconsti-
tutional because it made inadequate provision for several representa-
tion within the system. Although it is a coherent extension of the first
two television decisions, the third decision is unique and important be-
cause it squarely confronts the question of how, if at all, private televi-
173. Id But see C. STARCK, RUNDFUNKFREIHEIT ALS ORGANISATIONSPROBLEM 39
(1973).
174. The work of Professor Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 10, is basically a long memoran-
dum, prepared at the request of the Intendant of Radio Bremen, commenting on the consti-
tutionality, general legality, and efficacy of the then-proposed law, which was subsequently
enacted.
175. All five of the following suggestions are found in id at 50-51.
176. Id at 47.
177. 57 BVERFGE at 295.
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sion could exist within the parameters of current West German media
jurisprudence. More precisely, it defines the requirements for an effec-
tive internal pluralism.
Until 1967 there was a fair consensus among the German Lirnder
that broadcasting operations were to be carried out by public law cor-
porations.178  It was therefore a complete surprise when, on June 7,
1967, in a ten-hour session, the Saarland Parliament pushed through an
amendment to its broadcasting law which made possible for the first
time private German-language broadcasting in West Germany.
179
Shortly thereafter, on March 26, 1968, Free Broadcasting, Inc.
(Freie Rundfunk A G, or F,4 G) was formed for the purpose of private
broadcasting in Saarland."8 When the government of Saarland re-
fused to grant it a license,18 ' FR4G filed suit. t8 2 After a torturous ten-
year appellate history, 83 the German Constitutional Court finally
178. This consensus was reflected in a number of inter-ILnder contracts calling for com-
mon financial and programming arrangements, such as the contract funding the Second
German Television network (ZDF). See Herrmann, 4uswvirkungen des FAA G-Ureillr des
Bundesveqfassungsgerichts, 1981 FILM UND RECHT [FuR] 630, 631.
179. Law on the Organization of Broadcasting in Saarland, June 7, 1967, (Geset: Nr. 806
aber die Veranstaltung von Rundfrunksendungen im Saarland) [hereinafter cited as GVRS or
Saarland law], reprinted in SAARLXNDISCHES AMTSBLATT 478 (1967). Under the law, any-
one who wanted to produce private broadcasting programs in Saarland needed only to apply
to the government for a concession. GVRS §§ 38 and 39(1). (This and other relevant sec-
tions of the Saarland law are found within the text of the third decision, 57 BVE.U:GE at
298-301, and partially translated infra at text accompanying notes 197 and 199.) According
to section 39, there was no legal right to the concession, which the Minister Pratsident of the
Saarland could deny, grant, or grant with conditions attached.
180. Herrmann, supra note 178, at 631.
181. Id
182. 57 BVERFGE at 302.
183. The appellate history is cited in the beginning of the third decision, 57 BVERFGE at
302-04, and reads essentially as follows: The administrative court dismissed the claim (Un-
taigkeitskage) andFP.4G appealed. The intermediate administrative court, on its own mo-
tion, sent the case up to the Constitutional Court in 1974 for a ruling on whether the GYRS
was constitutional
The Constitutional Court refused to rule on the constitutional issue, sending the case
back down to the intermediate administrative court on March 24, 1976, for a decision on
what amounted to "independent state grounds." In May of 1976 the intermediate court
ordered the Saarland government to rule on the application. In October of that year the
government rejected the application on the ground that, even though the law conceived of
private broadcasting media, it did not mandate it, and the government was therefore stand-
ing by the basic choice of public law stations. Furthermore, the Saarland government was
restrained from doing anything which would endanger the existence of the public stations.
Such a danger was foreseeable because of the expected losses in advertising revenues which
the public stations would suffer when forced to compete with a private broadcaster. (See
note 31, supra, for an explanation of the financing of German television).
FR4G immediately appealed the government's decision, again to the lower administra-
tive court, which in 1978 sent the case, as did the intermediate court before them, up to the
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agreed to rule on the constitutionality of the Saarland law.' 84
During this time, the pressure for private law television in West
Germany was continually building.' 8 5  The newspaper publishers
claimed that they needed to have access to the new media in order to
survive.'i 6 The ministers of the various German Lander had reached
an accord on the introduction of four cable television pilot projects, 8 7
and further agreed that one of the four projects would make room for
the participation of private broadcasters.' 88 The Luxembourg govern-
ment was proceeding with its plans to lift a satellite into orbit, from
which to broadcast a commercial program in the German language. 89
Simultaneous with these technological developments, there were con-
stant reports from expert commissions,190 parliamentary debates, t19 po-
sition papers from the various political parties and unions, 92 scientists'
affidavits, 193 and meetings of various technologically, ideologically, and
economically interested groups.194
Constitutional Court which this time agreed to rule on the constitutionality of the Saarland
law. In sending the case up for this ruling, the administrative court said that if the law was
declared constitutional, it intended to rule that FRiAG should be granted a concession.
FRAG had apparently fulfilled all the legal requirements, and therefore, the lower court
claimed, the government was not entitled to resort to very general considerations about the
desirability of private television, which in any case had been negated by the legislative deci-
sion incorporated in the Saarland law. If, on the other hand, the law was unconstitutional,
FRA4G would have no law on which to base its claim, and the case would be dismissed,
For an overview of West German court structure, see generally Meador, Appellate Sub-
ject Matter Organization: The German Design from an American Perspective, 5 HASTINOS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 27 (1981).
184. 57 BVnRFGE at 305.
185. See Roeber, Verfassungsrechtiche Weichenstellung /lr elne bundesdeutsche
Medienpolitik, 1981 FuR 621.
186. The notorious Axel Caesar Springer of the Bild Presse led the group. See Klein-
steuber, Das verordnete Bedar/nis-Rundunkfreiheit und Interessenpolltik, in DIE
VERTEIDIGUNG DER RUNDFUNKFREIHEIT 111-12 (M. Thomas ed. 1979).
187. Roeber, supra note 185. The four pilot projects (in Ludwigshafen, Munich, Dort-
mund, and Berlin) have recently come to fruition. See also infra notes 302-36; Kabelfern.
sehen, supra note 6; Hoffmann-Riem, Modellversuch als Scheintest, 1980 ZRP 31, (claiming
that these pilot projects are really preparatory to the introduction of an already determined
private system rather than a true test of that system's capabilities).
188. See infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
189. LOwer, supra note 14. But see infra text accompanying notes 342-48 (the satellite
project was subsequently abandoned).
190. Roeber, supra note 185.
191. Id
192. Set out in Braun & Darkow, supra note 21, at 218-35.
193. See supra note 174.
194. Roeber, supra note 185.
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B. The Issue Defined
The lower administrative court requested a ruling in particular on
whether four specific sections of the Saarland law' 95 (Geselz tiber die
Veranstaltung von Rundfunksendungen in Saarland, hereinafter GVRS)
were consonant with the article 5 guarantee of broadcasting free-
dom.196 The sections of GVRS in question were:
1) section 38, which provided that "anyone who wants to pri-
vately produce broadcasting programs needs a concession;"
2) section 40(1), which determined that the producer would
have the form of a private corporation with its seat in Saarland; and
3) sections 46 and 46b(l), which together legally defined the
form of internal pluralism to be required in all concessionaire
stations. 197
Section 46 declared, under the heading of "special conditions,"
that the concession could only be given to those companies "whose ar-
ticles of incorporation. . give the advisory council the participatory
rights envisioned by this law. ... '98 Section 46b(l), under the head-
ing of "Advisory Council-Tasks," named those participatory rights:
The general public is to be represented vis-a-vis the program
producer by an advisory council. The members of this council are
required to look after the total interests of the producer and of the
broadcasting consumer. They are not bound by any mandate or in-
struction. The advisory council watches over the observance of the
legal requirements for broadcasting as well as the observance of the
company's own bylaws. The advisory council advises the program
producer and the supervising authority of any corresponding viola-
tions. It discusses all questions which are of basic importance to the
producer. It counsels the producer in the shaping of its
programming.1
99
The law-made only the barest determinations about membership in this
council, -specifying simply that the Catholic and Protestant churches
should each send one representative. 201 Nowhere was the council given
195. See supra note 179.
196. 57 BVERFGE at 304.
197. Id
198. Id at 299.
199. Id at 299-300.
200. GVRS § 16(2), reprinted in id at 301. Twenty additional representatives are to be
elected by the parliament on the suggestion of the Committee (Ausschuss) for Cultural Pol-
icy and Youth Problems. This is similar to the "parliamentary" version of internal plural-
ism, inherited and practiced by the stations in the former British zone, whereby the social
groups nominate, and parliament affirms, the representatives of the socially relevant groups.
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any power beyond that of advising, discussing and watching over the
station.2 o1
The lower administrative court further requested that the Consti-
tutional Court, should it find these four sections unconstitutional, de-
clare whether this unconstitutionality was fatal to the law as a whole.20 2
C. The Ruling
1. Sense and purpose of article 5
Like the earlier decisions, the court started with an analysis of arti-
cle 5. It introduced, however, a structuralist's refinement, setting
broadcasting freedom in the context of the other article 5 guarantees.
"Freedom of broadcasting serves the same purpose as do all of the
guarantees of article 5: free individual and public opinion building. ' 203
Broadcasting freedom must then be understood in reference to freedom
of expression, freedom of information, freedom to disseminate an opin-
ion, freedom of the press, and freedom from censorship. Relevant es-
pecially are freedom of expression and freedom of information, which
together comprise one loop.2°  It is the wholeprocess of communica-
tion which is the object of the freedom of broadcasting guarantee. 205
This refinement brought the concept of institutional freedom into full
bloom. 20 6
The court then reiterated its command to the state legislators that
they provide a legal structure sufficient to guarantee that this institu-
tional freedom, this "free and comprehensive opinion building,' 20 7 is
possible in broadcasting. "The need is much more for a positive order
which guarantees that the diversity of existing opinion finds its largest
possible breadth and completeness through broadcasting. ' 208 The court
thus brought home the full radicality209 of its media conception, a con-
201. Compare note 119. The critical difference between this model and the "pure" model
is that in the pure model the social groups themselves are the ultimate deciding force. Both
of these differ essentially, however, from the GVRS model where the social groups do not
even have a nominating function, (although they are to be "heard").
202. 57 BVERFGE at 304-05.
203. Id at 319.
204. Id
205. The court then states that the opinion building process, protected by the freedom of
broadcasting, occurs in every "transmission of information or opinion" (Id), thereby allud-
ing back to the earlier ruling that music and entertainment also transmit information con-
tributing to the opinion building process. 12 BVERFGE at 326 (quoted supra note 69),
206. See supra text accompanying notes 72-84.
207. 57 BVERFGE at 320.
208. Id (emphasis added).
209. Both United States and German law premise the existence of broadcasting on the
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cept which seeks to guarantee that any idea should be able to pass from
any point in society through television or radio to any other point in
society.
2. Beyond the special situation of broadcasting
By 1981 a situation was imminent where a vastly increased
number of frequencies would be available for broadcasting."" The op-
ponents of public broadcasting claimed that the special situation of
broadcasting no longer obtained and that broadcasting must thence-
forth be treated like the press.2I I Internal pluralism, they argued, must
give way to an external pluralism or market system, similar to the one
in the United States.212 The "integration model" (all social groups in-
tegrated into one or several stations) 213 would then be replaced by the
"coordination moder' (diversity secured by a multitude of competing
stations). 214
At no point in the decision did the Constitutional Court state that
scarcity-be it of frequencies, expertise, or capital-was no longer a
situation that set broadcasting apart from the print media. Instead, the
court was concerned that "a sufficient number of frequencies [did] not
stand ready to be used." '215 It referred again to the large expenditure of
money involved.216
The court also discussed the possibility that other factors might
contribute to the special situation of broadcasting. One of these factors
is the distinct historical situation of broadcasting. The press has devel-
oped to the point where a "limited"2 7 balance of information is guar-
anteed by external or market pluralism. No such claim could,
"public interest" (see, e-g., 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976)) andsupra notes 52-63 and accompanying
text), but in the United States the premise is to a great extent only theoretical because the
FCC lacks any effective power or mechanism to enforce the public interest. See generallj,
W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 3, at 151, 289-92; B. COLE & M. OETrioER, RELUCTANT
REGULATORS: THE FCC AND THE BROADCAST AUDIENCE (1978).
210. Professor Hoffmann-Riem estimates that the German market would not support
more than the number of stations-between 8 and 10-currently found in the larger Amcri-
can cities. See W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 3, at 32.
211. See Pestalozza, supra note 7.
212. Id
213. For a fuller explanation of this terminology, see W. HOF.MANN-RIEM,J71pra note 3,
at 26; D. STAMMLER, VERFASSUNGS- UND ORGANISATIONSRECHTLICHE PROBLEME DES
KABELRUNDFUNKS 34 (1978); Lerche, Landesbericht BRD, in RUNDFUNKORGANISATION
uND KOMMUNIKATIONSFREIHErr 49 (M. Bullinger & F. Kuebler eds. 1979).
214. Id
215. 57 BVERFGE at 325.
216. Id at 327, 334.
217. Id at 323.
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however, be made for broadcasting, which has matured as a public law
institution and which, if privatized, would be released as an innocent
into a fully developed market system.2 18 This could lead to a "concen-
tration of opinion-making power and the danger of misuse for the pur-
pose of a one-sided influencing of public opinion."21 9
Another factor which informs the court's thinking is the inherent
powers of television and radio, and above all their immediacy. 220 The
immediacy and pervasiveness of the media is one reason why broad-
casting assumes the role of "eminent factor and medium" in public
opinion building.221 One critic calls broadcasting an "instrument with
the suggestive force of 'being there,' a medium which quietly implies its
own objectivity. '222 He continues: "That broadcasting is. . . not to be
equated with the press is clear: broadcasting-especially in the form of
television-has, apart from the above mentioned advantage of credibil-
ity, also an advantage in comfortability, a premium of actuality, and,
above all, broadcasting has up to two-thirds other content. '223
But, rather than rule on the inherent powers of the broadcast me-
dia or whether the number of frequencies available and the economics
involved would allow the various social groups access to the media,
that is, whether the "special situation" per se still existed, the German
Constitutional Court shifted the ground of the argument. The court
held: "Even if the previous limitations [on broadcasting] were to disap-
pear, . . . it could not be guaranteed with sufficient certainty that a
218. Id
219. Id The court is quite possibly thinking here of the newspaper empire of Axel
Springer (see supra note 186) which controls about 40% of the German newspaper trade.
See Gro3, Das dritte Rundfunkurtell des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 1982 DVB 1 561, 564; see
also Report, Monopolkommission zum Privatfunk, 1981 FuR 657 (saying that at a local level
there is often little or no diversity in the press). Springer is poised, along with the Union of
German Newspaper Publishers, to move into the new electronic media. See F. HYMMEN,
supra note 99, at 75.
220. 57 BVERFGE at 320. Cf. supra note 94 and accompanying quotation. When the
court speaks of the frequency shortage and the financial barrier, it is arguably using these
terms only as examples of more widespread and essential differences between the print and
broadcast media. See also Roeber, supra note 185, at 625 (noting television's stronger ability
to influence opinion as a third component of the "special situation").
221. In the United States, the average child watches six, the average adult two and one-
half, hours of television per day. A. SMITH, supra note 35, at 215-16. The average citizen
has seen three years of television before reaching his or her teens, seeing between a quarter
and a half million commercials. Id In Germany, the figure is less, one and one-half televi-
sion hours per day (as compared with average newspaper reading of 32 minutes). BROAD-
CASTING YEARBOOK 12 (1974).
222. F. HYMMEN, supra note 99, at 95. For an American version of this theory, see getter.
ally M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA (1964).
223. F. HYMMEN, supra note 99, at 95.
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comprehensive program offering would be produced by the unwritten
laws of the marketplace." 224 The court's suspicion of the marketplace
was reflected in its reference to diversity in the newspaper market as
,,limited.,,225
In sum, the German Constitutional Court rejected the idea, so
prevalent in American media thinking,226 that the commercial market-
place and the marketplace of ideas are co-extensive.2 27 If the efficacy
of the market system is so questionable, the court reasoned, then great
care should be taken in releasing the media into that market system
because, once done, it would be almost impossible to reverse.228
In focussing on the potential of marketplace failure, present in
both broadcasting and the press, the court removes the special situa-
tion, as presently understood, from its central role in broadcasting ju-
risprudence. Although special situation theories are far from dead,2z9
their dislocation again poses the question of how to distinguish be-
tween the broadcast and print media.
One answer is the historical approach suggested in passing by the
third television decision. The court indicated that the differences be-
tween media were simply the result of a historical process which had
brought them to a point where the press is structured as an institution
of private law and broadcasting as an institution of public law.230 An-
other (and related) possibility is to avoid the question entirely. At least
one critic has read into the court's pronouncements on this point a de
facto "mass media separation of powers."'" Such a separation, while
not constitutionally compelled, nonetheless "serves as a principle for
securing a. . .large variety of information offerings. ' ' 2
224. 57 BVERFGE at 322 (emphasis added).
225. Id at 323. The German phrase is begrenzte Vielfalt meaning "limited variety," and
is read to mean that diversity in the newspaper world is barely adequate. See GroP, supra
note 219, at 563-64.
226. See, ag., Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ, v. FCC, 707
F.2d 1413passin (1983).
227. 57 BVERFGE at 323. "It is therefore uncertain [in a system of private television]
... whether all or at least a significant part of the social groups and philosphical views
would actually get to participate, whether a true market of opinions would result in which
the diversity of world views would find their unedited expression." Id
228. Id
229. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
230. 57 BVERFGE at 322-23. See also Hoffmann-Riem, The Freedom of Commmnications
and the Future of Broadcasting in West Germany (in English) in 17 STUDIES IN BROADCAST-
ING (1981).
231. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 230.
232. Id For an American version of this concept, see L. TRIBE, AMEUCAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 700 (1977).
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Finally, a possible solution might be to emphasize the television's
unique and vast potential. Such a teleological approach, hinted at in
various court statements, 233 is in one sense a forward-looking variation
on the special situation theory.
Rather than redefine the special situation, however, the court
based its decision in the FRAG case primarily on the logic or market-
place failure. The special situation of broadcasting is relegated to a
secondary role in the court's thinking. Regardless of how many new
broadcasting technologies or channels become available, the German
lawmaker has the continuing constitutional duty to provide a frame-
work within which broadcasting can function as a public institution.234
3. The Saarland law: how much pluralism is enough?
The Saarland law (GVRS) failed primarily, the court said, because
the mechanism for societal representation within the station was defec-
tive.2 35 In looking at the inadequacies of this version of internal plural-
ism, one can glean an understanding of what structures might provide
sufficiently pluralistic representation within the station, and therefore
be constitutionally permissible.236
The weakness of this attempt at internal pluralism was evident
even from the name of its representative organ. "Advisory council"
(Beirat), the court noted, was not nearly as specific, determinative or
commanding as "broadcasting council" (Rundfunkrat).2 37 The form of
internal pluralism set out at GVRS sections 46 and 46b(l) 2 38 was in-
deed ineffective in two respects.
First, the court found insufficient provisions for full societal repre-
sentation. 239 Only two social groups24° were identified apart from theparliamentary representation. The remaining ten members of the advi-
233. See, e.g., 31 BVERFGE at 325 (quoted supra text accompanying note 64).
234. 57 BVERFGE at 320-22.
235. Id at 305. Other defects which the court cites are: 1) the GVRS makes no provi-
sion for application procedures which private firms would follow in pursuit of the franchise,
and no statement about the requirements of the applicants or the standards to be applied in
judging the application; and 2) the law does not specify any procedure for the eventuality
that more than one firm would apply for a given frequency or time-slot. Id at 326-27.
236. The demands on internal pluralism organs are similar for public and private organi-
zations, although in the latter case the societal participation would have to be more strieI/y
provided for because of the dangers of "profit-oriented thinking" and self-serving propa-
gandizing. Id at 305.
237. Id at 331.
238. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
239. 57 BVERFGE at 331.
240. Id at 330 (quoting GVRS § 16(2)).
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sory council were to be selected directly by the Saarland Parliament
from a group selected by the state government's Committee for Cul-
tural Policy and Youth Problems.241 During the selection process, the
larger "communities of public life" were to be heard . 42 Thus the so-
cial groups themselves had no determinative input in the selection of
the board members who were supposed to represent them. 43
The second problem with this attempt at internal pluralism is that
the advisory council does just that-it advises, it counsels, it discusses,
it watches over.24' Nowhere does the law provide the council with any
determinative influence. It has no power to impose sanctions when its
recommendations are not followed. 45 In short, it has no clout.
Nor is the institutional freedom mandated by article 5 supplied by
the other provisions of GVRS: that it be a publicly held corporation
where no shareholder may hold more than fifty percent of the stock;
that there exist a government supervisory council, to which two mem-
bers of the advisory council belong; or finally that the state have the
power to grant or deny a concession. 46
The fact that there are no adequate provisions for ensuring that
society is adequately represented within the station was fatal, and the
whole of the Saarland law was therefore found void.247 The German
Constitutional Court thus showed that it is resolute about claiming the
electronic media for the public interest.24
D. Critique and Consequences
1. Reaction to the decision
The FRAG decision unleashed a largely negative response in the
legal journals of West Germany.249 The critics accused the Constitu-
tional Court of an insufficient understanding of the technical develop-
241. Id (citing GVRS §§ 46(c)(2), 16(4)).
242. Id
243. Id at 331.
244. Id (citing GVRS § 46(b)(1)); for a translation see supra text accompanying note
199.
245. Id
246.,.57 BVERFGE at 332-33.
247. Id at 334.
248. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367passim (1969). See also
supra note 209 and accompanying text.
249. See Pestalozza, supra note 7; Oppermann, Auf dent Iege -ur gemirchten
Rundfunkverfassung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1981 JZ 721; Degenhart, Recht-
sprechung, 1981 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTuNG [D6V] 960. But see, e.g., Gro3. sra
note 219; Hecker, Zum Urteil des BVerfG van 16.6.1981, 1981 DE.NIOKRATIE UND REcirT
[DuR] 419.
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ments occurring in the electronic media.250 Supporters of the decision
noted its consonance with the two earlier television decisions, 25 , as well
as the increasingly unimportant role of technological developments per
se in the philosophy of West German media jurisprudence.2 52
The criticism of the FR,4 G decision centered on the court's evalua-
tion of the market dynamic.253 This evaluation was said to be com-
posed of only "vague allegations" which could not be a guide for the
"serious lawmaker.' 254 It was not adequate "to the primacy . . . of
communicative autonomy,"2 55 and only hindered the "experiment of
freedom. 256
The court's supporters pointed out that the court's distrust of the
"free play of [market] forces '' 57 was indeed based on more than specu-
lation.258 Since the late 1960s, five government reports had noted the
increasing degree of economic concentration in the newspaper indus-
try.2 59 It was rational for the court to conclude that the same process
would occur in a laissez-faire broadcasting market.260
These findings were affirmed by a new study of the Federal Re-
public's Monopoly Commission which appeared after, and was occa-
sioned by, the release of the FRAG decision.261 Because of the high
degree of concentration existing in the print media, the report recom-
mended a complete bar on ownership by the newspaper industry of any
future private broadcasting facility.2 62 It also cited the experience of
United States television as proof that advertiser-supported television,
because it is so oriented to a high audience share, could not supply the
constitutionally demanded level of program diversity.263
250. Scholz, Das dritte Fernsehurteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 1981 JZ 561, 562;
Pestalozza, supra note 7, at 2158.
251. See, e.g., Hecker, supra note 249, at 420.
252. See, e.g., Gro3, supra note 219, at 562.
253. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
254. Pestalozza, supra note 7, at 2163.
255. Scholz, supra note 250, at 564.
256. Pestalozza, supra note 7, at 2163-64.
257. 57 BVERFGE at 323.
258. Gro3, supra note 219, at 563-65.
259. Id (citing the Michel-Kommission, the Glnther Kommission, and the three govern-
ment reports on the situation of the press and radio in the Federal Republic released in 1970,
1974, and 1978).
260. See, e.g., Hecker, supra note 249, at 423.
261. Snow, supra note 52, at 23-24 (citing Federal Republic of Germany, Monopolkoin.
mission, "Wetbewerbsprobleme bei der Einfihrung Yon privatem H(rfunk und Fernsehen",
Bonn (1981)).
262. Id See also Grop3, supra note 219, at 563-64.
263. Snow, supra note 52.
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Other commentators suggest that user fees, similar to those in the
present West German public law system, would supply a more neutral
fundament for broadcasting activity even within a private law sys-
tem.2 " Advertising, to the extent on which it is relied,265 should be
confined to a limited amount of airtime and subject to thorough con-
tent regulation.266
2. Is any form of private television now possible?
Although the court stated in the FIA4G decision that it was not
going to rule on whether there was an individual constitutional right of
private media ownership, 267 its acute distrust of the marketplace2 61 left
great doubt whether private stations would, in practice, be constitution-
ally permissible. Critics also note that the court phrases its warning
against private monopolies in stronger terms than it previously had
used.269 This new formulation speaks of the danger of delivering me-
dia into "one or several ' 270 hands, which is a small but important am-
plification of "neither to the state nor any one societal group."2 71
The one point of consensus in Germany today seems to be that the
court's decision did effectively outlaw an American style laissez-faire
approach to the media. 72 In any future West German system there
will have to be more wide scale social participation than is currently
demanded under the United States Constitution. 73
Beyond that, the question becomes what is meant by the word
"private." German television is to a certain extent already "priva-
tized," in the sense that a significant part of its programming is bought
from private outside sources, including those in the United States.2 74
264. See, e-g., B. LANGE, KOMMERZIELLE ZIELE UND BINNENPLURALISTISCIIE ORGANI-
SATION BEi RUNDFUNKVERANSTALTERN 64-65 (1980).
265. In the public law stations, advertising is limited to approximately 3% of the total
airtime, and accounts for approximately 25% of total station revenue. Grop,Jspra note 219,
at 568; see supra note 31.
266. B. LANGE, supra note 264, at 65.
267. 57 BVERPGE at 318. The court says that it is only going to rule on the constitution-
ality of the Saarland law. Although the earlier decisions had expressly held that private
television was not precluded by article 5 (12 BVERPGE at 262), they had never ruled on the
question of whether there exists an individual constitutional right to broadcast privately. See
also supra note 51.
268. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
269. Oppermann, supra note 249, at 721, 727-28.
270. 57 BVERFGE at 325.
271. 12 BVERFGE at 262; see also 31 BVEPFGE at 325.
272. See, eg., Oppermann, supra note 249, at 729.
273. Id
274. Id Some people fear that a full privatization of German television would bring
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Thus the word "private" has various postures, levels, and degrees of
meaning, each implying a certain form of broadcasting organization.
The third decision presents the legislator with a series of choices.
The first choice, or level of choice, is between the internally pluralistic
station and the externally pluralistic system.27  "The legislature must
determine what is necessary to secure broadcast freedom. . . the Basic
Law does not prescribe any specific form of organization. 276 Thus the
lawmaker must decide between an "internally pluralistic structure...
in which the influence of the relevant social groups is transmitted inter-
nally through organs of the program producer," 277 and an "externally
pluralistic diversity" where the "total offering of domestic programs
corresponds to the existing diversity of opinion. 278 While the former
model has been specifically sanctioned by the court from the date of the
first decision,279 a legislative decision for external pluralism would
probably need to be constitutionally supported by a scientific progno-
sis280 to the effect that all social groups and world views would likely be
accounted for in the new system. 8
The West German Constitutional Court was aware that individual
with it a larger importation of American programming, which they see (correctly in the
author's opinion) as lowering the general quality of German television. See Schultz-Keil,
Kojak, Colombo undandere, in EIN ANDERER RUNDFUNK - EINE ANDERa REPUBLIK 63-64
(M. Thomas ed. 1980).
275. Herrmann, supra note 173, at 638. But see Pestalozza, supra note 7, at 2164, who
claims that as soon as the frequency shortage is remedied, the legislature has no choice but
to provide for private broadcasting without restraint or organizational or programmatic bal-
ancing. This position is typical of those critics who see the frequency shortage as the only
essential difference between broadcasting and the press and who are unable to find anything
but an individual right of self expession in the Basic Law guarantee of broadcast freedom.
Thus they see the public law's internally pluralistic structure as a "continuing suspension of
constitutional rights" rather than a safeguarding of them. Pestalozza, supra note 7, at 2160.
276. 57 BVERFGE at 321.
277. Id. at 325.
278. Id
279. Id (citing 12 BVERFGE at 205, 262).
280. Herrmann, supra note 178, at 643. Critics are, however, skeptical about the scien-
tific neutrality of such research, fearing its potential politicization and noting that telecom-
munications research is generally predisposed to the telecommunications industry. See
Address by W. Hoffmann-Riem, Policy Research on Telecommunications in West Germany,
4-7 American Telecommunications Conference, in Annapolis, Maryland (1983) (The text of
this speech is available from the Hans Bredow Institute for Radio and Television, Univer-
sitlt Hamburg, W. Ger.).
281. Herrmann, supra note 178, at 643. Herrmann, although he understands and ap-
proves of the logic behind such a ruling, finds it strange in the application. "Will there
always be an equal number of red and black, left and right, progressive and reactionary
station applications in order to achieve a total balancing of broadcast programming." Id
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and public or objective rights collide within the broadcast realm.282
The court's solution was simple. "It is the task of the legislator to bring
such collisions into balance." 283  From the public function which
broadcasting plays, it is clear that such balancing will be predisposed to
the group right.284
Another possible choice for the legislature, and a possible outcome
of the court's balancing, might be a mixed system, where the public
sector maintains primary importance in a gradually developing, par-
tially privatized broadcasting landscape.28 5 To the extent that this the-
sis would place the onus of diversity on the public law stations, it
ignores some fairly clear language in the third decision. The fact that
all "important social groups get to participate within the realm ofpub-
lie law television and that the citizen recipient can thereby comprehen-
sively inform himself' would in no way free potential private television
stations from the constitutional demand for a well balanced diversity of
opinion."' An "additional one-sided consideration of single opinion-
carriers in private broadcasting" would "disturb that balance.. . if not
eliminate it."'2 87 Thus, a mixed system would only be possible if that
balance of diversity were preserved, if that balance were either im-
planted within the private station, or imposed on the whole system
from without.
A legislative decision to implant diversity within the private sta-
tion288 would almost certainly entail some form of internal pluralism
within that station's governance structure.2 9 This theoretically posited
mixed form for broadcasting stations is denounced by private television
advocates as "unauthentic" and a "shell game of legal forms."'  It is
argued that no entrepreneur would want to invest his or her money in
an organization where he or she did not have complete decisional
autonomy.291
This argument overlooks several factors. First, the internally plu-
ralistic broadcasting council only makes long term editorial decisions;
282. 57 BVERFGE at 321; see supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
283. 57 BVER:GE at 321.
284. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 230,passim.
285. See, e.g., Oppermann, supra note 249, at 729.
286. 57 BVERiFGE at 324.
287. Id
288. "Private" in the sense that they would receive their revenues from either a "pay-
TV' system or from advertising. See Report, Mfonopolkommission -um Privafunk, 1981
FuR 657.
289. Roeber, supra note 185, at 628.
290. Kull, Das FA4 G-UrtelI-Kritik und Prognose, 1981 FuR 644.
291. Roeber, supra note 185, at 624; Herrmann, supra note 178, at 643.
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the short term editorial decisions and general administration of the sta-
tion would still be in the station owner's hands.292 Furthermore, the
court itself notes that businesspeople participate in other areas where
their activities are highly regulated, such as banking and insurance.29
In such a mixed station form, businesspeople would still find room for
business opportunity and for expression and dissemination of their
opinion, albeit within a more defined organizational matrix. Thus, a
mixed station form might very well be the result of the balancing which
the court has posited.
Various other mixed models have been put forward which would
synthesize elements of both private and public law institutions. In the
"Pribag" model, an internally pluralistic broadcasting council would
actually share in the ownership of the station. 294 Another model would
integrate "private law structures under a public law roof. ' 295 In the
Ludwigshafen cable television pilot project,2 96 a public law internally
pluralistic umbrella organization was formed to coordinate and admin-
istrate the input of several private as well as public feeder
corporations.297
Should some form of constitutionally acceptable private law tele-
vision be developed, the Constitutional Court hints about further regu-
lations which might be instituted in order to secure the public interest.
Among these are regulations on financing,298 stock ownership,299 state
supervision of content regulations, °30 as well as provisions, where nec-
essary, for internal pluralism.'
3. The "normative power of the factual" 302-cable television
pilot projects and new media laws
The Constitutional Court was fully aware of the rapidly evolving
technological state of the broadcasting art, especially as such changes
were contemplated within the framework of the four planned cable pi-
292. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
293. 12 BVERFGE at 262.
294. See F. HYMMEN, supra note 99, at 76.
295. Id
296. Kleinsteuber, supra note 186, at 118. See also infra text accompanying notes 315-41,
297. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 187, at 33.
298. 57 BVERFGE at 324.
299. Id at 332.
300. Id at 326. Although the demand for "balance" might be dropped in an externally
pluralistic system, the command of comprehensive and truthful broadcasting would still be
present. Id
301. Id at 330-31.




The necessity of a legislative basis and parliamentary decision
also applies to experiments which are limited in a temporal and geo-
graphical sense. These have the same constitutional posture as do
more permanent arrangements, although they may be granted some-
what more latitude because their very purpose is to gather new
data.3 4
The court's decision nonetheless left many essential issues un-
touched or undecided,30 5 and in other problem areas entrusted deci-
sion-making discretion to the lawmaker.3 6 The proponents of private
television have seized upon these uncertainties and used their legisla-
tive discretion to its full extent in order to "create facts" which have
moved the country as a whole closer to private television.30 7
The new facts include: 1) The West German Post Offce's ongoing
project to lay a nationwide cable net,308 2) the manner in which the
cable pilot project in Ludwigshafen has been carried out,30 9 3) the
Rhineland-Palatinate media law which provides the legal basis for the
Ludwigshafen project,310 4) the research project which accompanies the
Ludwigshafen project,311 5) the report of the Experts Commission on
New Media and the ensuing proposed media law for Baden-Wtlrttem-
berg,312 6) the proposed law for Lower Saxony,31 3 and 7) various satel-
303. Herrmann, supra note 178, at 640.
304. 57 BVERFGE at 324. In so stating the case, the court seems to answer affirmatively
the question "is cable television 'broadcasting' in a constitutional sense?" F. HY.I.%tEN,
supra note 99, at 81.
305. Among the many questions left undecided were: 1) whether an individual has a
right to broadcast privately (see Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 187, at 32; supra note 267 and
accompanying text); and 2) how many cable stations it would take to create a true external
pluralism (see supra notes 209-12). But such talk of numbers begs the central question,
which is whether any market system, regardless of how many stations, could account for and
to the plurality present in society. See, eg., Grol3, supra note 212, at 566; see also sutra
notes 217-20, 268-84 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 275-78, 285-88 and accompanying text.
307. See, eg., Grol3, supra note 219, at 564, 566-67 andpasrsim.
308. Blttthmann, Gaul, & Hoffmann, Im Kabel vefangen, DIE ZErT, January 27, 1984, at
17, coL 4. This relatively new development represents a frontal attack on public broadcast-
ing in West Germany. Although nominally compatible with public law broadcasting, the
cable net in reality represents "expensive preparatory work for commercial TV producers."
Id
309. See generall, Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 187.
310. Id
311. Id
312. See Hoffmann-Riem, Ein Anlauf zum privaten Rundfunk, 1981 ZRP 177. See also
Oppermann, supra note 249, at 724; GroO3, supra note 219, at 568-69.
313. See Oppermann, supra note 249, at 723.
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lite and other extra-territorial broadcasting projects. 314
A short examination of the Ludwigshafen project will flesh out the
effects of the FRAG decision, indicate the cable project's potential un-
constitutionality, and illuminate the political process in West Germany
today. The roots of the four cable projects lie in the 1976 Telecommu-
nication Report of the Commission for the Expansion of Technical
Communications Systems (KtK),31 5 which recommended the testing of
new communications technologies in the form of pilot projects. 31 6 In
1978 the Minister-presidents of the various German states agreed to
four such projects-in Berlin, Dortmund, Munich, and Ludwigsha-
fen-and that some degree of private participation would be allowed in
the Ludwigshafen project.31 7
The legislature in Rhineland-Palatinate took full advantage of this
opportunity to enact a media law for Ludwigshafen which foresaw the
substantial participation of private broadcasters. 8  The law and the
project have been hailed (and criticized) as a "Copernican change . .
from internal to external pluralism. 319
Under the Ludwigshafen law, each person (or corporation) has an
individual right to broadcast or cablecast. 320 There are no regulations
as to the structure of station management and no responsibility on the
part of the program producer to create a balanced or diverse pro-
gram.321 Balance and diversity are to be supplied by the "sum of all
the unbalanced programs" 322 and enforced by a pluralistically consti-
314. See infra notes 342-48 and accompanying text.
315. Federal Republic of Germany, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Kom.
mission fAr den 4usbau des technischen Kommunikationsysteme, TELEKOMMUNIKATIONS-
BERICHT (1976), cited in Snow, supra note 52, at 12-13; and in Hoffmann-Riem, supra note
187, at 31.
316. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 187.
317. Id In North Rhine-Westphalia (Dortmund) and Bavaria (Munich), the state legis-
lators decided to incorporate the projects into the existing public law structures and there-
fore no "founding law" was constitutionally required. Oppermann, supra note 249, at 725,
In Berlin, the project was to be very limited, consisting only of interactive videotext. 1d,
It is interesting to note that the people of Bavaria, often reputed to be the most con-
servative in Germany, reacted in 1978 to government plans to introduce private television by
voting for an amendment to the Bavarian Constitution (art. 11 la) which expressly and un-
conditionally forbids such private broadcasting. Id at 723.
318. Landesgesetz Ober einen Versuch mit Breitbandkabel yom 4.121980, cited in Gro3,
supra note 219, at 567.
319. Oppermann, supra note 249, at 725.
320. Id. Unless otherwise indicated, "broadcasting" will imply and include
"cablecasting."
321. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 187, at 35.
322. Grop3, supra note 219, at 567.
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tuted institutional assembly,32 the so-called "public law roof or
umbrella."324
Critics of the Ludwigshafen model claim that this public law um-
brella lacks the power to effectively create a plurality in the total televi-
sion offering.3 5 The assembly does have the power to limit the amount
of time a broadcaster is given, and to enforce certain fairness-type regu-
lations.326 Thus it is perhaps more effective than the station which was
the subject of the Constitutional Court's latest decision,327 although the
very power which the Commission has seems to contradict the auton-
omy which is promised to the broadcasters under law.328 There are
also no mechanisms-no application procedures or standards-in the
new statute to secure a balanced and diverse pool of participants from
the very beginning of the system.329 Observers fear that a model of this
type creates nothing more than an external regulatory instance, similar
to the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
which is relatively impotent in the face of economic concentration and
programming homogeneity.330
Furthermore, the allowance of twenty percent of a station's total
airtime for commercials, and the resultant dependency on advertising,
is said to create a flattening dynamic, which might quash any further
potential for diversity.331 At least two observers have declared the pro-
ject unconstitutional.332
One expert questions whether the pilot project is really a test at all,
or whether it is just a political ploy to prepare the public for the even-
tual nationwide introduction of private television.333 The scientific re-
323. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 187, at 33.
324. Grool, supra note 219, at 567.
325. Id at 567-68.
326. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 187, at 36.
327. See supra notes 235-48 and accompanying text.
328. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 187, at 36.
329. Grop3, supra note 219, at 567. Dr. Gropl notes that it is further unclear how the
assembly would decide which broadcasters would be limited should the assembly find a
state of unbalance. I
330. Id at 564; Hoffinan-Riem, supra note 187, at 35.
331. Grop, supra note 219, at 567.
332. Id at 570; Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 187, at 38. The Rhineland-Palatinate law is
declared by another observer to be "not as unconstitutional" as the Saarland law. Herr-
mann, supra note 178, at 640. Dr. Herrmann is also of the opinion that, should cable televi-
sion be thrown open for private investment, the newspaper publishers would have Ies right
than others, instead of more, as they claim, for a license to operate this new media. This is
because the danger of "media concentration" would be more acute in the case of the pub-
lishers who already control much of West German media. Id at 637.
333. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 187,passim.
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search projects which accompany the project are claimed to be pre-
programmed to validate its success.334 Finally, the project will create
entities (a cable net, large private investments which would be negated
in the unlikely event that the test were to be declared a failure, and the
companies themselves) which will in turn make it difficult for any fu-
ture legislative or judicial body to do anything335 but "passively ratify
the actual change. "336
The proposed laws in Baden-Wtirttemberg and Lower Saxony of-
fer essentially the same model: private companies under a public law
roof.337 They differ from the Rhineland-Palatinate law for Ludwigsha-
fen in that they are conceived of as a permanent framework for future
television activity.33
Critics have noted that the report of the Experlenkommission Neue
Medien, which underlies the Baden-Wiirttemberg law, did not even
consider how the existing internally pluralistic system could be im-
proved.339 It did offer warnings about the dangers of economic concen-
tration and questioned the need for more mass media programming,
but only along the way to its final recommendation that television be
opened to private producers and that a vast number of new stations be
made available.340
For one observer, the "Copernican change" from internal to exter-
nal pluralism represents a turning away from the principles of the
FRAIG decision: "Broadcasting freedom is understood [in these new
proposals] as freedom for the producer and the entrepreneur, not how-
ever for the communicator and recipient. ' 341
4. Satellite and other extra-territorial broadcast projects
The questions presented by the planned Luxembourgian satellite
have for the present become moot. In April, 1983, the French govern-
334. Id at 37-38. In addition to the narrow course in which the research project is to be
performed, Professor Hoffmann-Riem notes that no provisions are made for researcher ac-
cess to company information. He compares this to the way the United States company,
Warner Communications, was able to refuse access to data on its Qube project, filter the
information which it did give out, and finally produce its own highly laudatory report of the
program. Id at 38 n.46.
335. Id at 38.
336. Oppermann, supra note 249, at 722. Oppermann finds this desirable. But see Hoff-
mann-Riem, supra note 187, at 38.
337. Oppermann, supra note 249, at 722, 724.
338. Id
339. Hoffman-Riem, supra note 312, at 179.
340. Id
341. Id at 185.
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ment, acting at the urging of the German government, prevailed upon
Luxembourg to drop its plans for launching its own satellite," in
which the German Union Of Newspaper Publishers (DBZV) was to
have a large percentage share.343 The planned satellite broadcast of a
German commercial television program into German territory, against
the will of the West German government, raised complex legal issues of
national sovereignty. 3' For a while, the West German government
had plans to jam the projected broadcasts, which raised another set of
legal problems.34
German television jurisprudence is, however, still in danger of be-
ing compromised by the invasion of commercial television signals from
extra-territorial sources. 3" Together with the large German publisher,
Bertelsmann, Luxembourg has recently begun broadcasting a nightly
five hour, private, German-language entertainment program from a
large transmission tower on Luxembourg's border with West Ger-
many.347 Bertelsmann is also part of a consortium of West German
publishers, including the Springer press, which plans to broadcast a pri-
vate domestic program from the European telecommunications satel-
lite, ECS-1, scheduled for launch in September of 1985.?"
5. In summary
The third decision represents the West German Constitutional
Court's clearest affirmation to date of the public character of the broad-
casting system in Germany. Its strong rejection of the market sys-
tem,349 its more qualified perception of diversity in the newspaper
world,350 the "new formulation" of the danger posed by private mo-
nopolization351 and the emphasis placed on the "institutional freedom
of broadcasting" 352 all contribute to the impression that the court
firmly believes in television as a public servant.
Some observers see in the treatment which the court accords to
broadcasting signs of a new order appearing, a de facto separation of
342. The Cabling of Europe, supra note 16, at 36-37.
343. Id
344. LOwer, supra note 14, at 733-34.
345. Id
346. The Cabling of Europe, supra note 16, at 37.
347. Rein Deutsch, 50 SPIEGEL, Dec. 2, 1983, at 59.
348. Id at 61.
349. See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
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powers, wherein broadcasting and the press would fulfill different func-
tions within society.353 Only time will tell whether a public consensus
develops around this view. Judging by past patterns, the FRAG deci-
sion should stand as the court's definitive media pronouncement for the
next ten years or So. 354 But with so many other powerful forces at
work, it remains to be seen whether the Constitutional Court will in-
deed have the last word.
V. COMPARISION AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE
GERMAN MODEL TO AMERICAN MEDIA
LAW
A. Introduction
The German system, its premises and its values, are so concep-
tually different from those of the American system that the American
observer finds such a system and its possible domestic application diffi-
cult to imagine. United States constitutional theory is in the grip of a
conception of the First Amendment as guarantor solely of individual
rights. 5 Furthermore, the average American may find it difficult to
imagine an internally pluralistic system in practice. 56 Finally, a belief
in the efficacy of the marketplace is central to the political self-under-
standing of the United States. 57 Taken together, these factors may
preclude visions of an American broadcasting structure with greater
democratic legitimacy and function.
This Note takes the position that the consideration and implemen-
tation of some German media ideas and organizational forms could
contribute much to the vitality of American radio and television.358
This section will first consider a few general constitutional principles of
United States media law, comparing and contrasting them with their
West German counterparts. Strategies for introducing West German
353. See supra notes 231-32 and accompannying text.
354. Herrmann, supra note 173, at 643.
355. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First.4mendment Right, 80 HARV. L. Rvv. 1641
(1967).
356. W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 3, at 61.
357. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners' Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1980); United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1436 (deregulation of radio).
358. Critics have lauded West German television, which, among other things, has taken
an active role in funding and producing the "New German Cinema," as well as works by
prominent directors throughout Europe. See Kaufman, Velvet Gloves, Ttis Nr-w REPU=LIC
Aug. 29, 1983, at 21 (suggesting that West German television might "turn out to be the




media jurisprudence into the American system, including a constitu-
tional amendment, will be discussed. Although the idea is intriguing,
this section will not look at any specific application of internal plural-
ism to commercial broadcasting in the United States.359 The premises
of the two systems are so fundamentally different that such a discussion
would devolve into an examination of the property rights of the indi-
vidual station owner, 360 a subject beyond the scope of this writing.
This section will conclude by looking at the possible applicability of the
West German model within the United States' public broadcasting
system.
B. Internal Pluralism as a Form of Access
The West German idea of internal pluralism fits roughly into the
spectrum of access mechanisms which in the United States have been
used or considered in the name of public interest. "Access mechanism"
is here understood in a very general sense, meaning any instrumentality
designed to increase the diversity of voices in the media, instead of its
more common and limited usage referring only to the right of a specific
speaker to have his or her message broadcast.36'
The forms of access fit into two large categories. First there are
mechanisms designed to control the structure of the market, the totality
of television offerings in what the West Germans would call an exter-
nally pluralistic setting.3 62 They include provisions against common
359. It would, however, be interesting to explore the application of the internal pluralism
concept with regard to the FCC. As it now exists, most of the commissioners have close ties
to industry, and the "revolving door" is the prevalent career pattern. See Robinson, The
Federal Communications Commission " An Essay on Regulatoq
, 
Matchdogs, 64 VA. L REV.
169, 170 (1978); see also B. COLE & M. OErrGoE, supra note 209.
360. It is interesting to note that in 1924 the U.S. Senate passed a bill which in effect
nationalized the airwaves:
[T]he ether and the use thereof for the transmission of signals, words, energy, and
other purposes . . . is hereby reaffirmed to be the inalienable possession of the
people of the United States and their Government, but privileges to enjoy such use
may be granted as provided by law for terms not to exceed two years.
S. 2930, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1924). Although this view still informs our licensing scheme
and surfaces occasionally in Supreme Court opinions (see, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)), the public's sense of proprietary con-
nection to the airwaves is tenuous indeed. From the very beginning of American broadcast
history, large business interests have dominated the medium. See W. HOFIMANN-REIM,
supra note 3, at 173 (Westinghouse, General Electric, United Fruit Co., and American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. were "pioneers" in the field).
361. An example of the traditional limited usage of "access" may be found in the Court's
discussion of leased access in CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., discussed infra at notes 386-
400.
362. See, eg., supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
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ownership of multiple stations;363 a policy in favor of local ownership
of broadcasting licenses;364 licensing provisions in general, which pro-
vide for licensing "as public convenience, interest, or necessity re-
quire;' ' 365 and antitrust initiatives to break up network dominance in
the field of television production.366
Second there are the program-oriented or content-based access
statutes, regulations, or policies, 367 to which the word access more com-
monly refers, such as the Fairness Doctrine368 and the candidates' ac-
cess rule.369
The internal pluralism model has characteristics of both these cat-
egories. Because public television in West Germany has at present a
monopoly, 370 internal pluralism operates to control the contours of the
total program offering. Although in that sense it is an external struc-
tural safeguard, its real genius-and hence its name-is that it achieves
its aims functioning within the station structure. In this, it has no
American equivalent.
Internal pluralism also has aspects of program-oriented access reg-
ulations. Unlike such American rules as the Fairness Doctrine or the
candidates' access rule, internal pluralism does not provide immediate
access to the airwaves for a certain viewpoint or speaker. It is rather
mediate access, access to the organizational structure of the individual
station. Thus internal pluralism, although it shares some characteris-
tics of American access mechanisms, is really suigeneris, a unique con-
tribution of West German media theory and practice.
C. Internal Pluralism and the United States Constitution
Internal pluralism, as it is theoretically justified by the German
Constitutional Court, is a function of article 5 broadcast freedom,
which in turn is informed by the article 5 freedoms of expression and
information.37" ' Article 5 protects the entire communicative process,
363. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a) (1982).
364. See Mid-Florida TV Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1 (1972).
365. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307 (1976).
366. See United States v. NBC, 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
367. See generally the discussion in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
368. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). There is some argument whether section 315(a) is really
a "codification" of the doctrine. Nonetheless the section contains all the operative words of
the doctrine.
369. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
370. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
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the speaker as well as the information recipient.372 The object of the
broadcast freedom guarantee, then, is the communicative function of
the broadcasting institution.373 It is not only a guarantee of broadcast-
ing independence from the state; it is also a positive command that the
state provide the organizational prerequisites for public access to a
whole spectrum of information.374
Because the United States Constitution's first amendment contains
no express guarantee of access to information or institutional broadcast
freedom, it is not surprising that it is interpreted primarily as a guaran-
tee against government interference.3 75 The right of the speaker is sac-
rosanct and primary.3 7 6 Freedom of speech is set in the context of the
individual rather than the social process of communication. 3 "n It is a
"natural right" of human beings, necessary to their full self-develop-
ment in the search for truth.378 The rights of the general public as lis-
teners, readers, and information recipients are nowhere mentioned,
certainly not within the text of the Constitution.379 The societal need
for comprehensive access to information is left to the marketplace.38 0
Thus the marketplace of ideas is equated with the commercial
marketplace.
The forms of program-oriented access discussed above, and, afor-
tiori, internal access to the management of a station, "challenge the
laissez-faire premises of the First Amendment."381I Demands for access
pose the question whether a largely unregulated commercial market
should give way to some sort of government regulation of that mar-
372. Id
373. Id
374. See, ag., supra notes 65-67, 78 and accompanying text.
375. See, ag., J. Douglas' dissent in CBS, 412 U.S. at 148. See also N. HENTOFF, ThE
FIRST FREEDOM: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (1980). See
generally A. SMITH, supra note 35, at 34-35 for a discussion of the controversy between J.
Stuart Mill and James F. Stephen about whether ideas move in society through a free mar-
ket or through a force field of coercion and power, and about the role of the government in
regulating that flow.
376. See Barron, supra note 355.
377. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAuF. L REv. 422,
424-25 (1980) (referring to theories of the first amendment which posit no purpose for it
beyond individual self-fulfillment).
378. M. FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW 11 (1982).
379. Cf. id at 665. But see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972), where the
Court referred to a first amendment right to receive ideas and information. See infra notes
462-70 and accompanying text.
380. See, eg., supra note 357 and accompanying text.
381. B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS V. PUBLIC ACCESS 3 (1976).
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ket.382 The answers of the courts of the United States have been mixed.
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,383 the United States
Supreme Court, in declaring the Fairness Doctrine to be constitutional,
seemingly reversed the traditional American fixation on the rights of
the speaker. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount. '384 The Warren Court contin-
ued, sounding almost like the German Constitutional Court laying the
groundwork for a system of internal pluralism: "It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences which is crucial here."3 "
Four years later, however, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a ma-
jority in CBS v. Democratic National Committee,386 re-installed the
right of the broadcast speaker as the favored right. "Congress and the
[Federal Communications] Commission could appropriately conclude
that the allocation of journalistic priorities should be concentrated in
the licensee rather than diffused among many. ' 387 The Chief Justice
thus refused to mandate "leased access" or the right of an individual or
group under the first amendment to get their message broadcast for the
market advertising rate. In so ruling, the Court stressed the congres-
sional rejection of any effort to view broadcasters as common
388carriers.
CBS clearly reveals the Burger court's antipathy to the idea of me-
dia access, as well as the Court's lack of theoretical unity in this vital
area of first amendment law.389 Three justices390 found no state action,
and hence no first amendment violation, in the broadcaster's refusal to
accept a paid political announcement. 391 The justices were swayed
neither by the fact that a government license is the sine qua non of a
broadcaster's existence,392 nor by the fact that broadcasters supposedly
382. Id
383. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See also supra text accompanying notes 7 and 59.
384. 395 U.S. at 390.
385. Id
386. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
387. 412 U.S. at 125.
388. Id at 108-09.
389. See generally Emerson, supra note 377, at 440 ("On the whole [the Burger Court]
has refused to press first amendment doctrine forward but rather has tended to withdraw,
frequently by taking advantage of openings in Warren Court decisions. The lack of a coher-
ent theory has persisted.").
390. The Chief Justice, and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist.
391. 412 U.S. at 121.
392. See id at 175 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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operate as public trustees.393 These three justices also refused to hold
that television stations are public forums. 394
Three more justices395 assumed arguendo that the government was
significantly involved enough in the broadcasting scheme to warrant
first amendment review. For them, a broadcaster's relative auton-
omy-above and beyond the regulatory nexus with government-was
both consonant with the First Amendment and in the public interest.396
Justice Douglas, as the seventh justice concurring in the majority's
holding, flatly identified television and radio with the press and strictly
endorsed a laissez-faire regime for all three.397
Nowhere, as the dissent points out, was the concept of listeners'
rights seriously addressed.398  The doctrines of Red Lion were ig-
nored.399 The majority seemed locked into a wooden conception of the
first amendment as guarantor solely of individual rights, and then only
vis-a-vis government intrusion. Only the dissent discussed the holistic
dimension of first amendment protection and the public role which tel-
evision plays in modem society.'
The ideology of CBS was buttressed one year later in Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,4°1 where the Court held a "right to re-
ply" access statute for newspapers violated the first amendment rights
of the newspaper publisher. Although the Court acknowledged the
ongoing process of economic concentration in the press industry, which
creates in effect a form of private censorship,0 2 the Court said it was
powerless to do anything about this.40 3 Miami Herald held that the first
amendment could not operate as a sword to impose obligations on the
owners of the press, but only as a shield to protect them from govern-
ment regulation.
The Court thus solidified editorial control in the hands of the
owner, and identified ownership with free speech. This philosophy is
393. Id at 117-18. For Justice Stewart, it was critical to avoid equating broadcaster ac-
tion with government action, because this would inevitably lead to the necessity of labeling
broadcasters as common carriers. Id at 140.
394. See, eg., id
395. Justices White, Blackmun and Powell.
396. 412 U.S. at 147.
397. Id at 148, 160-61.
398. Id at 196 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
399. Id at 197.
400. Id at 189, 195.
401. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
402. Id at 248-54.
403. Id at 254-59.
404. Id at 251, 254.
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similar to the equation of political spending with free speech, as es-
poused by the Court recently in Buckley v. Valeo,4 °5 and First National
Bank of Boston v. Belotti.4 °6 Both of these decisions invalidated 40 7
laws, 4°s or portions of laws,4° 9 which limited campaign spending. Such
restrictions are "incompatible with the First Amendment. ' '4 10 Critics
have been quick to point out that the Buckley decision validates a con-
ception of pluralism as the brute clash of "highly organized and
wealthy groups, '411 and endangers the equality of participation upon
which democracy is built.4 12
The discounting of first amendment rights in the listener and gen-
eral public continued with the Court's decision in FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp.413 and Community Communication Co. v. City of Boul-
der.414 The Court in Midwest Video held that the FCC had gone be-
yond its statutory authority when it imposed access regulations on
cable television operators.41 5 In the Boulder case, the Court found that
the City of Boulder had engaged in a restraint of trade when it enacted
an "emergency" ordinance prohibiting for three months the expansion
of a local cable franchise so that the city council could draft a model
405. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
406. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
407. 424 U.S. at 39-59; 435 U.S. at 767.
408. In Bellotti, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977).
409. Sections 101-03 of Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 608(a), (c), (e) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976). Three other portions of the 1974 law-
dealing with record keeping and disclosures of candidates and their committees, public fi-
nancing of presidential campaigns, and the establishment of a Federal Elections Campaign
Commission to oversee administration of the law-were upheld by the Court.
410. 435 U.S. at 792 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945)). Judge Skelly
Wright has sharply criticized this opinion in two law review articles. See Wright, Money and
the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1982); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85
YALE L.J. 1001, 1017 (1976). Judge Wright noted that the decision of his Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit had upheld the spending limits in the Buckley case,
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840-41 (D.C. Cir. 1975), a ffd in part and rev'd npart , 424
U.S. 1 (1976). The court of appeals characterized political spending as ancillary to pure
speech in the same way that burning a draft card is. 519 F.2d at 843-44, 851-60 (citing
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
411. Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, supra note 410, at 1017,
Judge Wright points out that this model of pluralism (certainly very far from that of West
German TV) is a mechanistic conception which empties the term "public interest" of any
meaning apart from the outcome of the pressure group process.
412. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 204 (1971). Rawls argues that the liberties
protected by the principle of participation lose much of their value when those who have
greater private means are permitted to use their advantage to control the public debate, Id
413. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
414. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
415. 440 U.S. at 696-709.
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cable television ordinance and invite new businesses to compete under
the terms of that ordinance.41 6 Although neither'of these decisions was
decided on first amendment grounds, 417 their net effect was to hobble
both local and federal governments in their attempts to enforce public
accountability in the newly emerging cable television industry.
The underlying assumption in these cases seems to be that the
commercial marketplace is an adequate disseminator of information
and opinion.41 8 The fallacy of this premise, however, is manifest if one
takes a closer look at the way the market functions. First, it directs
itself to a majority, to the largest possible audience= 419 The idea that a
multitude of channels would lead to a segmentation of the audience
and a diversification of broadcast product has simply not been borne
out.420 Second, commercial television directs itself with special fervor
to a particular part of the majority curve, the demographically correct
consumer. Poor people are of inherently less interest to the broadcast
industry than those of more substantial means. 42' Third, the market is
not value-neutral. It identifies information or opinion contrary to its
basic premises and effectively expunges that point of view.422 Finally,
all markets are plagued with the same flaw: left unregulated, they tend
toward economic concentration. 2
The logic of marketplace failure, however, has yet to play a deci-
sive role in United States media law. To the contrary, a belief in the
market's efficacy is the justification and rallying cry for FCC's current
416. 455 U.S. at 57.
417. The Court inMidwest Video said that the first amendment issue was "not frivolous."
440 U.S. at 709. The court in Boulder did not even address the issue, ignoring completely a
lower court decision in which the first amendment rights of the Boulder public were dis-
cussed at length. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1376-
79 (10th Cir. 1981).
418. But cf supra note 402 and accompanying text
419. For a description of the tyranny of Nielsen numbers see L BROWN, TELEVISION:
THE BUSINESS BEHIND THE Box 15, 33, 35 andpassb (1971).
420. Specialty channels have either failed (CBS "culture" cable, see Rothbart & Stoller
Cabe at the Crossrads, CHANNELS, July/August 1983, at 32) or they have merged with other
specialty channels to garner the larger audience which they need to survive (eg., Daytime
and Cable Health Network). See Showtime Purchases Spotlight, BROADCASTING, Dec. 19,
1983, at 37.
421. This is shown, perhaps most cruelly, by the fact that black and poor neighborhoods
are historically the last neighborhoods and/or parts of cities to be wired. See Rothbart and
Stoller, supra note 420, at 36-37.
422. See, ag., Fred Friendly's (past president of CBS news) description of sponsor reac-
tion to Edward P, Murrow's "Harvest of Shame" broadcast. F. FRIENDLY, DUE TO CIR-
CUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR CONTROL 12-25 (1967).
423. See supra notes 259-63, 366, and 402 and accompanying text.
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deregulatory campaign.424
In view of the general tenor of the Court's recent media decisions,
a demand for internal access to a station's management seem clearly
beyond that which is permissible under the United States Constitution.
The German model implies for the electronic media a degree of com-
mon carrier or public utility status which the Supreme Court rejected
in CBS.425 Thus, internal pluralism represents in practice a subordina-
tion of the individual broadcast speaker's rights to the rights of the gen-
eral public, and that is clearly inconsistent with current first
amendment interpretation.426
D. Internal Pluralism and the United States Constitution-an
Alternative Analysis
The first amendment protects unpopular and unconventional
viewpoints from suppression. While the courts have generally been
vigilant about government incursion on free speech, it is seldom men-
tioned that the commercial marketplace is also capable of suppressing
opinions which it finds inconvenient.428 As Justice Brennan stated in
his dissenting opinion in CBS v. Democratic National Committee:
Stated simply, angry customers are not good customers and, in
the commercial world of mass communications, it is simply "bad
business" to espouse--or even to allow others to espouse-the heter-
odox or the controversial. As a result, even under the Fairness Doc-
trine, broadcasters generally tend to permit only established-or at
least moderated-views to enter the broadcast world's "marketplace
of ideas."429
Because traditional first amendment analysis focuses only on the right
of the speaker,430 there are many ideas which never get heard.
The idea that the first amendment primarily protects the speaker
becomes considerably less persuasive on closer analysis. As the cases
cited above indicate, there is no consistent theory of the speech and
424. See supra note 357 and accompanying text; infra note 548 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 47-48, 386-400 and accompanying text.
426. W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 3, at 50-56.
427. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "'New Media'-New Directions in Regulatitg
Telecommunications, 31 FED. COM. L. J. 201, 203 (1979).
428. Cf. CARNEGIE COMMISSION, CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC
BROADCASTING, A PUBLIC TRUST 29 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE II].
429. 412 U.S. at 187-88.
430. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
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press clauses of the first amendment.431 The actual text of the first
amendment is so scant that the "words simply do not yield a simple
exegesis. ' 431 History likewise is of little help. In considering the intent
of the framers, the only firm conclusion which can be made about the
first amendment is that the framers seem to have "had no coherent
theory of freedom of speech.) 433
In order to develop a coherent first amendment theory, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the values which have informed its interpreta-
tion. In the course of 200 years of United States constitutional history,
four separate but interrelated theories of free speech have coalesced:4
1) free speech as individual self-fulfillment;43 2) freedom of speech
leading to the discovery of truth;4 36 3) free speech as the predicate of
democratic self-government; 437 and 4) free speech as a steam valve to
let off excess societal pressure and preserve the balance between stabil-
ity and change.438
Of these values, it is only the self-fulfillment function which has no
social setting,439 which is "non-purposive."" Yet, in its consolidation
of first amendment protection in the broadcast speaker,' the Supreme
Court has given to the self-fulfillment value the leading role in first
amendment interpretation.
If on the other hand, one takes the approach of the structuralist" 2
and looks at the first amendment in the context of the whole Constitu-
tion, one sees the free speech guarantee as instrumental in effecting all
the other goals articulated therein. The Constitution as a whole "estab-
431. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech." An Inquir), into the Substance
and Limits of a Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978).
432. Id at 306.
433. Bork, Neutral Princioles and Some First 4mendment Problens, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22
(1971).
434. A good general discussion of these four theories is found in Emerson, supra note
377, at 423-28.
435. Compare notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
436. -The classic statement of this is found in Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919): "[Ihe best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
437. Dr. Alexander Meikeljohn was the first to fully elaborate this point of view in A.
MEiKELJoHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-GOVERNMiET (1948).
438. Emerson, supra note 377, at 428.
439. Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L REV. 964, 966
(1978).
440. L. TRIBE, supra note 232, at 576.
441. See e-g., supra notes 386-400 and accompanying text.
442. BeVier, supra note 431, at 308. See also supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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lishes a representative democracy," 443 an experiment in "self-govern-
ment [which] can only exist insofar as the voters acquire the
intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general
welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express. '444 Such
a view incorporates the truth-finding and steam-valve functions under
the primacy of self-government.
So analyzed, the first amendment does not protect the right "to
speak," but the freedom of "speech."" 5 It refers to the process of
speaking and listening as a unity, as "those activities of thought and
communication by which we 'govern.' "446 An individual must be able
to "hear all sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judg-
ment by exposing it to opposition, and make full use of different
minds."" 7
The right of the speaker, then, is not absolute in this analysis, but
must be balanced against other rights." 8 In the case of broadcasting,
the other right, that of the listener, is arguably not extraneous to the
first amendment," 9 but included in its sense and purpose. Indeed, the
Court in Red Lion talked specifically of first amendment rights of the
listener.450 This general line of argument has spawned an alternative
and almost underground tradition of United States media jurispru-
dence, first announced to the world by Professor Jerome Barron in his
1967 Harvard Law Review article, Access to the Press--a New First
Amendment Right. 451
Seen in this light, the first amendment not only allows the govern-
ment to provide access to the airwaves for diverse groups, it requires it.
The idea of internal pluralism, therefore, may not be as incompatible
with the United States Constitution as it first appears.
E. Implementing Access to Information and Access to the Media
Having arrived at the conclusion that a plurality of voices in the
electronic media realizes important first amendment goals, the question
becomes how to achieve that plurality. For this purpose, talking of me-
443. Id.
444. Meikeljohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255.
445. Id
446. Id
447. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
448. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 35, 55 (1961).
449. See, e.g., W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 3, at 49.
450. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
451. Barron, supra note 355. But see Baldasty & Simpson, The Deceptive !Right to Knaw"
How Pessimism Rewrote the First Amendment, 56 WASH. L. REV. 365 (1981).
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dia access is nearly equivalent to talking of access to information. An
increase in the diversity of media speakers will necessarily result in en-
hanced public access to a variety of information.
1. Media access through case laW?
The connection between the first amendment and ideas of media
access, however, is at best unstable. The Court in RedLion did indeed
suggest the relationship: "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas which truth will ulti-
mately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that mar-
ket, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee., 452
Nevertheless, the authority for the broadcast regulation of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 and its subsequent amendments and regulations
is usually found in the commerce clause and other police powers of the
government rather than in the first amendment.453 If the first amend-
ment is viewed as protecting the whole process of speech, however, it,
and not the commerce clause, is the more logical authority for media
access.
Apart from RedLion, several cases have briefly raised hopes that a
judicially cognized public right of access might be in the making. In
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 P. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc. ,454 the Supreme Court extended the public forum concept from
streets and parks to privately owned land which had many of the char-
acteristics of the traditional public forum. It held that a local shopping
center could not exclude peaceful picketers from its property.455 Any
hope that the principles of Logan Valley might be extended to the elec-
tronic media, however, was dashed in 1973 when the Court in CBS
strongly suggested that radio and television are not public forums. 456
Logan Valley itself was severely limited in 1972157 and was fully over-
ruled in 1976.458 Of the same cloth was Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights459 wherein the Court upheld a prohibition of political advertis-
452. 395 U.S. at 390.
453. W. HOFFMANN-REIM,Szpra note 3, at 49 (citing Malone, Broadcasting, the eluctant
Dragon: Will the First Amendment Right of Access End the Suppressing of Controversial
Ideas?, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 194 (1972)): "The federal control exercised over broadcast
licensees is an intermingling of the police power, the economic power over commerce, and
so much of the judicial power as is delegated in the establishment of administrative process."
454. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
455. Id at 309.
456. See supra text accompanying note 394.
457. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
458. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
459. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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ing in municipal transit facilities, holding that they were not public
forums.4 6 °
Although the Court has since made a few obliquely positive state-
ments about the value of "public discussion and participation in the
electoral process, '46 1 it is safe to say that the public forum concept is no
longer a viable means of access to the electronic media.
A second line of cases developed the concept of a right to know or
freedom of information.462 In the 1965 case of Lamont v. Postmaster
General,463 the Supreme Court upheld the right of citizens to receive
"foreign communist propaganda" from abroad without first having to
register with the government. Four years later, in Stanley v. Georgia,464
the Court stated that "it is now well established that the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas,"4 65 going on to up-
hold the right of persons to read or see pornography in the privacy of
their homes.4 66 Finally, in holding that commercial advertisement re-
ceived a form of first amendment protection, the Court has posited that
"society... may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial
information.
467
But the "right to know" line of cases has apparently also found its
limits. In Kleindienst v. Mandel,468 the Court recognized the Red Lion
right of the general public to have "access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences. 469 It nevertheless gave this
right no weight vis-a-vis the discretion of the Attorney General to ex-
clude under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952470 those who
advocate "world communism."
And in Houchins v. KQED,47 1 the Court again narrowed the pub-
lic's right to know. In view of a public television station's attempt to
obtain access to a local prison which had been the site of a suicide and
numerous complaints about conditions, the Court held that "[n]either
460. Id at 304.
461. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976).
462. See generally Emerson, Legal Foundation of the Right to Know, 76 WASH. U.L,Q. 1
(1976).
463. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
464. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
465. Id at 564 (citing, inter alia, Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965)),
466. Id at 567-68.
467. Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
764 (1976).
468. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
469. Id at 763 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390).
470. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(28)(D), 1182(a)(28)(G)(v), 1182(d)(2) (1977).
471. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right
of access to government information or sources of information within
the government's control." '472
Thus the right to know, postulated in Lamont v. Postmaster Gen-
eral and its progeny, also seems to be barren of any power to mandate
media access and information freedom.
2. Media access: a constitutional amendment?
In his seminal article on media access, Professor Barron suggested
a statutory solution to the problem of media access. 473 Apparently at-
tempting to preserve editorial sovereignty in the broadcaster or pub-
lisher, he recommended the "modest" statutory requirement that
"denial of [media] access not be arbitrary but rather be based on ra-
tional grounds."47 4 Professor Barron found constitutional authority for
such a freedom of expression statute in the due process475 and enforce-
ment clauses of the fourteenth amendment.476 The constitutional test
for such a statute would be the "sensitive" inquiry: "Does the statute
prohibit or provide for expression?" rather than the "wooden" and in-
flexible question: "Does the statute restrain the press?" 477 Standing to
challenge access denials would be given according to the standard for
FCC license challenges set forth in the first Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC: "responsible spokesmen for repre-
sentative groups having significant roots in the listening
community.' 478
Although this approach is laudatory, it has become somewhat un-
realistic in view of the interim developments in first amendment inter-
pretation. The West German concept of broadcast freedom would
perhaps offer a stronger theoretical basis for achieving diversity in the
airwaves.
As the first amendment was enacted in 1791, its framers found ref-
erence more in the tyranny of George III than in the possible concen-
tration of mass media power.479 It is further obvious that a writing 200
years old would be less adequate to the modem situation than a docu-
472. Id at 15.
473. Barron, supra note 355, at 1670.
474. Id
475. Id at 1674 (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)).
476. Id
477. Id at 1673.
478. 359 F.2d 994, 1005 (4th Cir. 1966).
479. M. FRANKLiN, supra note 378, at 7.
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ment from post-World War II Europe. The framers of the Constitution
simply could not have foreseen the development and effect of mass
electronic communications. 480  Being almost wholly a product of the
late twentieth century, West German media jurisprudence is bound to
be more sensitive than the United States Constitution to the dynamics
of modem society and to the power of the mass media.48'
It is for these reasons that this Note suggests a simple constitu-
tional amendment: the insertion into the first amendment of a clause
guaranteeing the institutional freedom of the broadcast media, and
making specific the included notion of public access to the full spec-
trum of opinion and information.482
Because the article 5 guarantees have been field-tested in a modem
constitutional democracy, future American courts and legislators
would not be without guidance in the implementation of the proposed
amendment. The amendment would hopefully anchor a public right483
to know and an institutional freedom for broadcasting services484 with-
out at the same time eviscerating the right of an individual to get up on
his or her soapbox. To the contrary, such a proposed amendment
could well make the soapbox a ubiquitous electronic phenomenon.
The author believes that this is consistent with the intent of the framers
and responsive to the needs of the twentieth century.
VI. PUBLIC BROADCASTING 451
A. "Neither State Nor Private?"
The public broadcasting system in the United States was created in
1967486 for many of the same reasons which animate West German
broadcasting as a whole. The congressional declaration of policy states
that the new system "will be responsive to the interests of people both
480. The German Basic Law was adopted in 1949. H. DICHGANS, VOM GRUNDGESlTZ
ZUR VERFASSUNG 13 (1970).
481. Professor Hoffmann-Riem speaks of article 5 as being more empirically oriented
than the United States first amendment. W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 3, at 58.
482. Apparently Professor Meikeljohn (cited supra at notes 437, 444) also proposed a first
amendment revision, adding the words "Congress . . .shall have power to provide for the
intellectual and cultural education of all of the citizens of the United States." Ferry, Mass-
comm as Education, 35 AM. SCHOLAR 293, 301 (1966).
483. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
485. This Note will not deal with the problems which the German court sees in a
"mixed" system of private and public stations. See, e.g., supra notes 285-87 and
accompanying text.
486. Title 47-Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs, Pub. L. No. 90-129, Title
II, sec. 201(9), 81 Stat. 368 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 396-99 (1976)).
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in particular localities and throughout the United States. . .and will
constitute an expression of diversity and excellence." 487 The public
broadcasting system was to supply the quality and diversity of which
the commercial networks were incapable. 88
Not only was the new public system supposed to be independent
of the marketplace, but it also was designed to be independent of gov-
ernmental influence. 489 Congress sought to insulate public broadcast-
ing from politics by creating the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
(CPB) through which federal funds would be channelled. 9° Its goal
was "maximum protection from extraneous interference and
control. 491
To a certain degree Congress has failed in both regards. 492 The
system is neither insulated from political pressure, 93 nor does its pro-
gramming reflect the diversity of the American populace.49 4 The sec-
ond Carnegie Report filed twelve years after the inception of CPB,
found that
Where is a widespread and growing perception among many groups
on the periphery of public broadcasting that it is a system which is
closed, unwilling to change, and afraid of criticism and controversy.
The testimony we have heard from representatives of minority con-
stituencies, independent producers, and avant-garde innovators was
filled with such assertions.9 5
This perception is borne out by the spate of complaints to the FCC
which charge that public broadcasting stations4 96 were not responsive
487. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5).
488. CARNEGIE II, supra note 428, at 25-29.
489. 47 U.S.C. § 398.
490. 47 U.S.C. § 396(b).
491. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(7). For an excellent description of congressional concern for the
independence of the new system, with excerpts from the congressional report, see Commu-
nity Service Broadcasters of Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1108-10 (D.C. Cir.
1978); see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PUBLIc TELEVISION,
A PROGRAM FOR AcTION 36-37 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE I.
492. For a European view of this failure, see W. HOFFMANN-RiEM, jupra note 3, at 116-
25.
493. CARNEGIE II, supra note 428, at 41-5 1; W. HOFFMANN-REIM, .Upra note 3, at 120-
25.
494. CARNEGIE II, supra note 428, at 280-83.
495. Id at 281.
496. Because it was prohibited by Congress from interconnecting the public broadcasting
stations into a fourth network, CPB established a new private entity in 1970, the Public
Broadcasting System (PBS), to operate and facilitate a common program for all the stations.
For an overview of the complex relations between CPB and PBS, see CARNEGIE 11, .supra
note 428, at 31-51.
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to minority "interest, convenience and necessity." '497 In his dissent to
the Puerto Rican Media Action decision, FCC commissioner Benjamin
Hooks put the matter succinctly:
By styling itself, preponderantly, as an electronic Harvard lib-
eral arts course, public broadcasting has forsaken those less privi-
leged and influential. . .It has overlooked the intellectual needs and
sensitivities of that core of the population which, after years of third-
rate education and cultural repression is just emerging from the
chains of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By disproportion-
ately featuring the refinements of Western European heritage, it has
slighted those whose heritage derives from Africa, Latin America
and the Orient.49
Furthermore, public broadcasting has not been able to insulate it-
self from political pressure. This was shown most spectacularly when
President Nixon vetoed the 1972 funding appropriation for CPB.4 99 As
a result, most of the programs which Nixon objected to were
dropped."° Public television therefore has today come to avoid con-
troversial topics in favor of more generally entertaining programs: con-
certs, theater, historical documentation, and reports on nature and life
in other countries instead of the potentially explosive domestic diver-
sity.50 Attempts to manipulate CPB from above are still current, as
evidenced by President Reagan's recent attempt to seat a member on
the CPB Board of Directors without the requisite congressional
approval. °2
There has been political pressure exerted on television stations not
only from the federal government but also at the state and local level.
In 1974, Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)50 3 member stations
changed their program selection practices, removing decisional compe-
497. See, e.g., Puerto Rican Media Action and Educational Council, Inc., 51 FC.C.2d
1178 (1975); University of Houston, 630 F.C.C.2d 566 (1978) (petition to deny filed by Na-
tional Black Media Coalition, et al.); Educational Broadcasting Corp., 68 F.C.C.2d 772
(1978) (petition to deny filed by Congress of Afrikan People). See generall, Comment, The
Right to Cultural Pluralism in Broadcasting, 6 BLACK L.J. 232 (1979).
498. Puerto Rican Media Action, 51 F.C.C.2d at 1199.
499. CARNEGIE II, supra note 426, at 43.
500. Id. at 43-44.
501. W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 3, at 124. The atrophying of public broadcasting
has obviously not occurred just as a result of the Nixon veto or of the flawed governance
structure, but also as a result of the financing structure. Instead of a "dedicated tax" on the
sale of television sets or a levy on the commercial stations for their use of the spectrum,
Congress has decided to appropriate the money for PBS out of the general fund.
502. San Francisco Chron., Sept. 16, 1983, at 11, col. 1.
503. See supra note 496.
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tency from their national board,5" which had often forced program
choices on the member stations. The stations instead instituted the Sta-
tion Program Cooperative (SPC), through which they collectively and
democratically decided on the programming of PBS.50 5 Although
designed to protect public television decision-making from national
political influence, this development left the stations wide open to influ-
ence from state and local governments. Such influence is almost inevi-
table in view of the fact that the majority of public television stations
are connected in some way with those local bodies: although private
parties can and do own and operate public television stations, "of the
approximately 285 public television stations in this country today, 132
are licensed to state or municipal instrumentalities, and 77 are licensed
to colleges or universities, most of whom are affiliated with
government."50 6
That individual stations, as well as the whole PBS system, are sub-
ject to political pressure, was shown by the matter at issue in Muir v.
Alabama Educational Television.501 There the controversial "Death of
a Princess" was banned from the air for fear of Arab reprisals in the
oil-sensitive gulf coast area.
Not only did the court in Muir fail to protect the integrity of the
public broadcasting process, it also revisited without success the whole
question of broadcaster autonomy versus listeners' rights. Justice
Douglas, in his concurring opinion in CBS,5 °0 had declared that "pub-
lic broadcasting ... raises quite different problems from those ten-
dered by [commercial] TV,"5 09 and strongly suggested that he saw state
action and a public forum in public broadcasting.5 0 The Court in
Muir, however, rejected that approach. Although it held that the two
broadcasting licensees involved were "state instrumentalities" 5"t it
ruled that these stations were not public forums,512 and that the station
licensees had the same editorial sovereignty as their private counter-
504. The local stations did and do have representation on the national board, but this
was not sufficient to give them a significant voice there. CARNEGIE II, .rura note 428, at 48.
505. Id. at 154-56. See also Barnstone v. University of Houston, 514 F. Supp. 650, 672-
73 (S.D. Tex. 1980), wherein the whole history of SPC is recounted.
506. 514 F. Supp. at 683.
507. 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (decision consolidates the appellate court's
reversal of Barnstone, 660 F.2d 137 (1981), and its affirmation of the district court's unpub-
lished opinion in Muir, 656 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1981)).
508. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 148-70 (1973).
509. Id at 149.
510. Id at 150.
511. 688 F.2d at 1041.
512. Id at 1042.
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parts.51 3 The effect of the decision was to discount listener/viewer
rights514 and arguably to hold those rights hostage to the political exi-
gencies of each local government unit.
Finally, the autonomy of public broadcasting decision-making
bodies is vitiated by commercial interests. By 1977, private corporate
sponsors (not including foundations) provided twenty-two percent of
the total PBS budget. 5 In 1981, Congress additionally sanctioned an
experimental program of advertising (logo and product identification)
on public television. 6 Advertisers are only too happy to pay high
rates for this de minimis exposure because public television effectively
delivers that segment of the audience most attractive to them-the so-
called upscale influentials5 7 This dynamic naturally creates pressure
on public broadcasting decision-makers not to program any fare which
might scare away the desired viewers.51
B. Internal Pluralism and Public Broadcasting-A Modest Proposal
Existing public broadcasting governance structures are essentially
inadequate to their task.519 The Corporation for Public Broadcasting is
run by a board of ten directors, all of whom are appointed directly by
the President "with the advice and consent of the Senate. ' 520 The only
meaningful condition on their election is that no more than six be
members of the same political party.52' Beyond that, it is suggested
that they be
eminent in such fields as education, cultural and civic affairs, or the
arts, including radio and television; [they] shall be selected so as to
provide as nearly as practicable a broad representation of various
regions of the country, various professions and occupations, and var-
ious kinds of talent and experience appropriate to the functions and
responsibilities of the Corporation.5 22
513. Id at 1043.
514. Id at 1041.
515. CARNEGIE II, supra note 428, at 105.
516. Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.
517. This audience is the natural result of the upscale programming described stpra in
text accompanying note 498.
518. See Dunagan, Commercialization of Public Broadcasting, 5 CoMM/ENT L.J. 241,
281-82 (1983). See also W. HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 3, at 123.
519. CARNEGIE II, supra note 428, at 13.
520. 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(1) (1976).
521. Id There are also requirements stated that they all be citizens of the United States
but not regular full time employees of same.
522. 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(2).
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This organizational suggestion is obviously inadequate to insulate
the board of directors from political influence." The fact that all of
the appointments flow from the President actually invites such undue
influence.5l This was illustrated again during the Nixon presidency.5 s
President Nixon's eleven appointments to the board of directors (the
total number was then fifteen) were able to sow considerable dissension
in the ranks of public broadcasting, leading to an open split between
CPB and PBS in 1972-73. 526
Nor is this fcrm of organization, empirically seen, equal to the task
of representing the diversity called for in the Public Broadcasting
Act.527 Although the law mandates variety, experience teaches that
most of the presidential appointments come from the same pool of
well-educated, well-heeled, white citizens.528
The Public Broadcasting Service, whose decisional competency re-
sides more at the station level,529 fares no better. The boards of the
individual stations are generally staffed with the same affluent upper-
middle class citizens who staff the national board and who have the
luxury of free time necessary for this generally volunteer activity.530
The second Carnegie Report tacitly recognizes this problem. It
recommends "public involvement in station governance through the
use of any of a wide variety of participation mechanisms including
-elected governing boards, citizen advisory committees, open board
meetings, and volunteerism. 531 This Note takes the position that the
introduction of an internally pluralistic governance model, 32 would
523. W. HOFFMANN-RiEM, supra note 3, at 116-25.
524. Id
525. CARNEGIE II, supra note 428, at 45-46.
526. Id
527. See, ag., 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5)-(6).
528. Lee, The Private Reality of Public Television, WORKING PAPERS, Mar.-Apr. 1981;
Chapman, Down With Public Television, HARPERS, Aug. 1979, at 77. A major United States
union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME),
has filed a complaint with the FCC, charging that public television programming reflccts a
pro-corporate, antilabor bias: "[A] review of governing boards of public television stations
... indicates an almost complete absence of organized labor representatives .... The
governing boards... contain a high percentage of business, finance and other corporate
management representatives." Cited in The New Economics of Public Televiion (Mimeo-
graphed publication of Institute for Public Television, Oakland, Cal).
529. See supra note 496 and accompanying text.
530. Rowland, Public Involvement: the Anatomy of a Hyth, in Tim FUTURE OF PUBUC
BROADCASTING 109, 114 (D. Cater & M. Nyhan eds. 1976).
531. CARNEGIE II, supra note 428, at 287.
532. Seesupra text accompanying notes 130-32. The problem of providing public broad-
casting with an insulated source of income still remains.
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bring about a public broadcasting system that is more responsive to the
diverse cultures within United States society and more insulated from
political and economic pressures. The problem of identifying the rele-
vant social groups would be especially acute in this country, which has
a much more diverse population than West Germany. This is, how-
ever, not an insurmountable obstacle, especially in light of some of the
techniques suggested above.533
The model could be introduced both at the national CPB level and
at the local level of each PBS member station. At the national level,
internal pluralism would be a coherent extension of the spirit of the
CPB governance statute already in place.5 34 Such an amendment to
the present law would shift the appointment capacity from the Presi-
dent to groups in the wider societal sphere.5 3 5 At the local level, inter-
nally pluralistic boards could be made a pre-condition of the CPB
community service grants going to local PBS member stations. 36
Internally pluralistic station governance also solves the censorship
argument which has so bedeviled access theorists. Instead of forcing
media to cover all viewpoints and setting up a bureaucracy of "petty
public officials" 537 to monitor their performance, the pluralistic broad-
casting council represents the rights of the public inside the broadcast-
ing station. It creates a legitimacy separate from that of the local
government unit. 38 It also renders moot the question of broadcaster
autonomy versus listener rights, as these two terms are substantially
merged in an internally pluralistic environment.
VII. CONCLUSION
An understanding of the West German media debate has much to
offer to the American discussion. First, on a theoretical level, it brings
an awareness of the unique potentials and dangers of broadcasting, es-
pecially public broadcasting.539 An exposure to West German media
jurisprudence will hopefully unhinge the American legal scholar from
his or her fixation on the first amendment as solely a guarantor of
533. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
534. 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(1), (2) (1976).
535. This assumes the adoption of the direct or "pure" internal pluralism. See sqra note
119.
536. For an explanation of the community service grants, see CARNEGIE 11, stpra note
428, at 124-26.
537. T. EMERSON, supra note 447, at 671.
538. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
539. See, e.g., supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
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speakers' rights."4 It might also make the American reader a little
more skeptical about the adequacy of the marketplace to regulate the
flow of information and opinion in modem society.5 4' The West Ger-
man discussion could also point the way beyond the frequency
shortage for United States lawmakers as they grapple with the distinc-
tion between the broadcast and the print media. 42
On a more concrete level, the West German model suggests two
changes which the United States might make in its law to better realize
the full potential of the broadcast media. One is the insertion of a
clause into the first amendment guaranteeing the right of free access to
information through broadcasting. 43 The other is a change in the gov-
ernance structure of the public broadcasting system.544 Internally plu-
ralistic boards of directors, both at the national and the local level,
would go a long way towards realizing the initial promise of the public
television.
Were the United States lawmakers to integrate some of the West
German media concepts into the American media system, there would
be a certain historical and poetic justice to the act. It would be the
reaping of fruit from a tree which the Americans helped plant some
thirty-five years ago in West Germany.545
Yet to write of the broadcasting media in a utopian vein is some-
what of a quixotic venture in the year 1984. Both in West Germany
and in the United States, the voices demanding complete deregulation
of the media are becoming louder.5 46 In both countries, the proponents
of deregulation cloak themselves in the language of populism: give the
mature citizen (mitndiger Brger)547 what he or she wants; let the public
decide by its marketplace choices what it wishes to see and hear."
Those who would question the efficacy of the market are dismissed as
elitist and paternalistic.5 49
What is at stake here, however, is the "control of information in a
540. See, eg., supra note 355 and accompanying text.
541. See supra notes 524-28 and accompanying text.
542. See supra note 230-34 and accompanying text.
543. See supra note 482 and accompanying text.
544. See supra note 531 and accompanying text.
545. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 7 and 357 and accompanying text.
547. See, eg., Sch~ner Schein, 51 SPIEGEL, Dec. 19, 1983, at 167, 170.
548. See, eg., Fowler & Brenner, A Mfarketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
Tex. L. Rev. 207passim (1982).
549. Letter of Erwin G. Krasnow, Senior Vice President of the National Association of
Broadcasters, in CHANNELS, May/June 1983, at 6 ("Stripped to its essentials, the [opposition
to deregulation] advocates an elitist, 'force them to eat cake' approach of a paternalistic
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democratic society"550 and the marketplace is simply not an effective
and neutral disseminator of that information.55" ' Populist formulas
place at a disadvantage those with information needs different from the
market majority. More importantly, such formulas truncate the scope
of political and social discourse.
Perhaps the essential difference between United States and West
German media law is that the West German jurisprudence takes the
insufficiency of the market mechanism as one of its major premises.
From the West German point of view, it is remarkable to what extent
our first amendment has become a guarantee of media ownership
rather than of democratic communication.
This Note recommends that the electronic media, as constitutive of
and essential to democratic self-government, be placed at some dis-
tance from the rigors of the marketplace. The logic of media as instru-
ment of self government is compelling when one considers the immense
potential of broadcast technology, as the second Carnegie Commission
did:
By providing a uniquely constructed special window on society,
television and radio shape it and define it. Public broadcasting can
easily bring together, face to face, people who might otherwise never
meet in daily life. Such communication provides breathtaking po-
tentialities for our sense of community. It can harmonize us in our
local concerns. It can bind a nation together by constructing a com-
mon catalog of the best in our own society and world culture. A
hundred years ago, such experiences were the preserve of a wealthy
elite. Now they can be made available to all. The determination to
do so is necessary.5 52
government.") See also Krasnow, Cole & Kennard, FCC Regulation and Other OxymrtOOI/S:
Seven Axioms to Grind, 5 COMM/ENT L.J. 759, 761-65 (1983).
550. R. BROWNSTEIN & N. EASTON, REAGAN'S RULING CLASS, 685, 688 (1983) quoting
Rep. T. Wirth (D-Colo.).
551. See supra notes 418-23 and accompanying text.
552. CARNEGIE II, supra note 428, at 28.
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